The Elements of Politics Henry Sidgwick

The State of the Text

The body of the text is complete up through the 20th chapter. The footnotes past the third chapter are not linked in as yet, nor are the cross reference links made. External references are made for the first three chapters but not for any subsequent chapter. This text is actively being worked on, so these defects will be remedied fairly soon, we hope.

The Source of the Text

This text was scanned in from the fourth edition of 1919 published by MacMillian and Company, London. That edition, as far as I can tell, however, is just a reprint of the third edition of 1908.

Table of Contents

Prefaces

• Preface to the First Edition
• Preface to the Second Edition
• Preface to the Third Edition

CHAPTER I

SCOPE AND METHOD OF POLITICS

• Section 1 The Theory of Politics, as here expounded, is concerned with human societies, regarded as possessing Government
• Section 2 Its primary aim is practical, to determine what tbe constitution and action of Government ought to be: accordingly its method is not primarily historical
• Section 3 Its principles are based on psychological propositions not universally and absolutely true, but approximately true of civilised men. It does not profess to furnish a complete solution of particular problems
• Section 4 It has two main divisions; one concerned with the Functions of Government, internal and external, and the other mainly with its Structure

CHAPTER II

FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTIONS OF POLITICS

• Section 1 Let us first examine the fundamental conceptions of Government, Law, Right, Obligation.
• Section 2 We may regard the civil law of a modern civilised state as a body of rules laid down by the supreme Legislature of the State : hut Austin's statement that the power of this Legislature is always legally unlimited requires qualification
• Section 3 ``Obligation'' denotes the relation of a rule or command to a will constrained by it: a ``Right'' is the same fact regarded in relation to the person to whom the obligation is intended to be useful

CHAPTER III

GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LEGISLATION

• Section 1 Assuming generally an orderly community, let us consider on what principle the laws defining the primary civil rights of the governed should be determined
• Section 2 The ultimate standard here adopted is conduciveness to general happiness,
• Section 3 There are various possible methods of promoting general happiness; but the action of government in modern States is mainly based on the Individualistic principle, which limits the internal functions of government to the prevention of mutual interference among the govemed. Accordingly, I shall begin by examining the application of this principle to the chief questions of a civil code

CHAPTER IV

INDIVIDUALISM AND INDIVIDUALISTIC MINIMUM

• Section 1 The Individualism here worked out must be distinguished from that which takes Freedom---absence of physical and moral coercion---as the ultimate and sole end of governmental interference
• Section 2 An examination of the chief civil rights that modern governments actually aim at securing, under the heads of Personal Security, Property, and Contract, shows that the fundamental aim is not merely to prevent mutual coercion, but to prevent mutual harm and annoyance and interference with each one's efforts to procure the means of happiness
• Section 3 No Individualist would apply ``Laisser Faire'' except to sane adults: hence an Individualistic scheme must provide for the sustenance and care of children, and regulate the relations of the sexes with a view to this
• Section 4 The Individualistic determination of rights of property and contract will be discussed in the next two chapters. Besides the protection of these rights, legal repression of physical annoyance, of deception, of intimidation, of disturbance of social relations by slander or otherwise, is also to some extent necessary on the Individualistic principle---at any rate if interpreted, as here, in a utilitarian sense: though it is not always easy to define generally the conduct that law should prohibit

CHAPTER V

ON PROPERTY

• Section 1 The Right of Property in material things, as commonly understood, includes the right to use, to exclude others from using, to deteriorate or destroy, and to alienate;---perhaps also to bequeath, but this last element I shall treat separately
• Section 2 On the Individualistic principle the ``first discoverer'' may be allowed to appropriate, if the opportunities of others are not thereby materially impaired; but the appropriator of land will usually owe some kind of compensation to society for diminished opportunities of obtaining utility
• Section 3 Appropriation of land for cultivation carries with it the appropriation of vegetable products and tame animals. The cases of uncultivated land and wild animals are more doubtful: but the appropriation of the former and indirectly of the latter may be justified---from the utilitarian point of view here taken---by demonstrated increase of utility
• Section 4 Appropriation of the surface does not necessarily carry with it a right to all minerals below the surface: and in the case of rare and valuable minerals, it may be expedient not to give the owner an exclusive right of extraction. The appropriation of land reclaimed from water depends on the labour required for reclamation.
• Section 5 Rights of partial use of material things may be appropriated and transferred. Among other property-rights, copyrights, and---in a more limited degree---patents, may be justified on the Individualistic principle.
• Section 6 For general security, ancient bona fide possession must be admitted as a valid title to property

CHAPTER VI

CONTRACT

• Section 1 Enforcement of Contract is fundamentally important in an individualistic system. The term is here used in a wide sense, to include agreements modifying rights in rem as well as those that only give rise to rights in personam
• Section 2 It is generally expedient to enforce contracts, if deliberately made between persons possessing at the time mature reason, and without illegal coercion or intimidation
• Section 3 or wilful or negligent misrepresentation of material facts
• Section 4 and if the effects that they were designed to produce involve no violation of law or cognisable injury to the commuuity
• Section 5 It may become, through change of conditions, impossible or on the whole inexpedient to fulfil a contract to render future services. In such cases the obligation of the promiser should be limited to---at most---compensation for damage suffered by the promisee through nonfulfilment. The further restriction on the obligation which bankruptcy law admits is difficult to reconcile with Individualism; but in the main it may be justified on utilitarian grounds
• Section 6 One-sided transfers of utility---including promises---should, if adequately evidenced, be enforced on the individualistic principle
• Section 7 Any form of collective ownership with ``limited liability'' should be allowed, on this principle, provided its conditions are sufficiently explained by those who enter into it to those who deal with them

CHAPTER VII

INHERITANCE

• Section 1 Theoretically, Freedom of Bequest is a doubtful point in the Individualistic scheme: actually it is restricted in several modern states by old limitations in the interest of the family; and sweeping limitations of it have been recently proposed in the interest of the community
• Section 2 Limitations in the interest of children seem only justifiable, so far as necessary to secure children proper training and sustenance till they can provide for themselves
• Section 3 The consideration of the drawbacks of fiduciary ownership illustrates the theoretical difficulty of barmonising Freedom of Bequest with due Freedom of the survivors
• Section 4 The sweeping restrictions proposed by Bentham and Mill seem dangerous
• Section 5 Passing to Intestate succession, we may approve of exclusion of collaterals---in the degree proposed by Bentham---and of equal division ``by stocks'', on the ground of conformity to natural expectations

CHAPTER VIII

REMEDIES FOR WRONGS

• Section 1 To remedy wrongs Government may intervene by euforcing Reparation or inflicting Punishment. The distinction between the two is not quite so fundamental as it is sometimes held to be; because the primary aim of Punishment is Prevention, not Retribution,
• Section 2 and the prevention of future mischief is an important---and generally the most decisive---consideration in determining when to enforce damages. At the same time it is practically important to maintain the distinction; since the governmental procedures appropriate respectively to Reparation and Punishment are markedly different
• Section 3 In some cases it is difficult to find a satisfactory mode of Reparation: especially in the case of insults
• Section 4 The adequate degree of punishment is not easy to determine: it may be reduced by increased efficiency of police and judicature. In selecting the kind of punishment, the importance of Equability, Variability, ``Exemplariness'', ``Frugality'', and Remissibility should be noted

CHAPTER IX

PREVENTION OF MISCHIEF AND PATERNAL 1NTERFERENCE

• Section 1 Besides actually enforcing Reparation and inflicting Punishment for wrongs, Government should punish incitements to the violation of rights, intervene to check it when committed or threatened, allow self-defence and self-reparation in some degree, and imprison suspected criminals. It may usefully give warning against mischief, and watch processes liable to be attended by it
• Section 2 It has been disputed whether Government may properly prohibit acts merely because they involve a risk Of mischief to others. But this kind of ``indirectly individualistic'' interference seems clearly expedient in some cases: nor can the amount of it be limited by definite rules; but, having inevitable drawbacks, it should be minimised
• Section 3 This ``indirectly individualistic'' interference blends in practice with ``paternal " interference in the interest of the persons interfered with; the distinction between the latter and directly individualistic interference is sometimes subtle,---especially in cases of precautions against imposition
• Section 4 There seems no adequate reason for condemning absolutely even ``paternal'' interference (with sane adults); especially in mild forms; such as interference by dedining to interfere
• Section 5 Individualism of course admits paternal interference of Government to protect children from parental oppression or neglect; but the consideration of governmental aid to education carries us into the discussion of Socialism

CHAPTER X

SOCIALISTIC INTERFERENCE

• Section 1 Laisser Faire rests on two assumptions: (1) psychological, ``that individuals are likely to provide for their own welfare better than government''; and (2) sociological, ``that the common welfare is likely to be best promoted by individuals promoting their private interest intelligently''. The first excludes ``paternal'', the second ``socialistic'' interference. Neither assumption is completely true
• Section 2 In any case, on strictly individualistic principles, the appropriation of natural resources by individuals may be indefinitely restricted in the interest of the community. Apart from this, abstract theory shows several cases in which the individual's interest does not tend in the direction most conducive to the common interest,---even assuming that utility to society is accurately measured by market value
• Section 3 These cases largely explain the extent to which, in modern States, the provision of commodities is actually undertaken or regulated by Government, with a view to benefit the community as a whole: This kind of interference may be called, in a wide sense, Socialistic
• Section 4 Public expenditure for emigration, education and culture, art and science, is defensible on similar grounds
• Section 5 An important amount of ``Socialism'' (in this sense) is found in the civil law of the moat individualistic of modern States---e.g. in the received limitation of copyright, and the limitation of contract by bankruptcy
• Section 6 ``Socialism'', in a narrower sense, aims at greater equality in the distribution of wealth. Public ownership and governmental management of the instruments of production would tend to realise this; but would arrest industrial progress and diminish the product to be distributed. Still the gain of reducing the actually existing inequalities of income is on the whole clear; and expenditure directed to this end, in the way of equalisation of opportunities, is defensible on individualistic grounds
• Section 7 Government provision for the relief of indigence is necessary; but the best method of making it is difficult to determine. The rational determination of this, and of the limits of Socialistic interference generally, depends partly on varying social and political conditions

CHAPTER XI

THE MAINTENANCE OF GOVERNMENT

• Section 1 The effective performance of governmental functions involves legal repression of either overt resistance to, or indirect interference with, the discharge of official duty
• Section 2 It also requires an extensive provision of (a) personal services---which, whether voluntarily or compulsorily rendered, must be mostly remunerated,---(b) material products of labour, and (c) land or other natural resources
• Section 3 The supply of funds thus required---though temporarily they may be to a great extent borrowed---must in the long run be mainly raised by taxation (in a wide sense)
• Section 4 In distributing the burden of taxation, the principle ``that recipients of utility from Government should pay in proportion to the utility received'' should be applied so far as it is fairly applicable. But the utility of the greater part of the cost of Government cannot be thus individualised
• Section 5 In distributing the greater part of taxation, therefore, ``equality of burden'' should be the aim. But ouly a rough approximation to this is possible, especially as it is desirable that the contribution of the poor should mainly take the form of taxes on non-necessary consumption. Taxes on inheritance are sui generis, and may be fairly made a special burden on the propertied classes

CHAPTER XII

GOVERNMENTAL ENCROACHMENTS AND COMPENSATION

• Section 1 Governmental interferences with established private rights are in various ways inevitable: it is therefore important to consider how far compensation is consequently due to private persons
• Section 2 Except at special crises, the products of industry should generally be purchased by Government from voluntary sellers at their market value; but land may be fairly taken compulsorily, at the price it would have had apart from the governmental need, together with compensation for any special loss which the previous owner suffers in consequence. But the public may claim as a set-off any additional value which accrues to the remaining property of the person expropriated, from the governmental use of the land taken. Other invasions of legally secured expectations of individuals should be compensated on similar principles.
• Section 3 If changes in law determining rights of property---and analogous rights---inflict definite and considerable damage on individuals, a claim to compensation should be admitted; but not necessarily to full compensation, so far as the most profitable use of the right was---before the legal change---a subject of general moral condemnation
• Section 4 Changes that aim at a more equitable distribution of burdens of taxation do not---speaking broadly---justify a claim for compensation. Nor, ordinarily, do changes in the industrial action of Government, unless the amount of loss that they inflict on special classes is peculiarly sudden and severe

CHAPTER XIII

LAW AND MORALITY

• Section 1 Positive law and Positive Morality may be distinguished by their respective sanctions. But they also differ importantly, regarded merely as intelligible systems since in the former case doubts as to what is law may be authoritatively removed by judicial interpretation, and divergencies between what is and what ought to be law may be removed by legislation
• Section 2 But with morality it is otherwise; hence there is much more vagueness, uncertainty, and variation in the established moral code than in the established law
• Section 3 The danger of conflict with positive morality limits importantly the action of government; on the other hand, positive morality is to some extent modifiable by the legislator
• Section 4 Positive morality is further politically important, for the repression by censure of various kinds of mischievous acts which cannot so well be repressed by legal penalties, and for the encouragement by approbation of beneficent acts
• Section 5 Prima facie it would seem reasonable for Government to provide and pay for teaching in morality: but there are strong arguments on the other side. Practically, the question for a modern Government is how far it should subvent and control Churches. This will be considered later (Chap. XXVIII.)

CHAPTER XIV

THE AREA OF GOVERNMENT---STATES AND DISTRICTS

• Section 1 It would be a great gain if the whole of civilised society could be brought under a common government, for the purpose of preventing wars among civilised men. But it is at present hopeless to aim at this
• Section 2 A State is an independent society of human beings, living in a certain degree of civilised order, and united by obedience to a common government, which exercises supreme dominion over a certain territory. According to the political ideal, practically now dominant, a State should be coextensive with a Nation; i.e. its members should be united by a further sentiment of community, not dependent on the existence of a common government
• Section 3 Even where this is not the case, a part of a State is not held to be justified in attempting to secede from the rest with its territory, except on grounds of serious oppression or misgovernment
• Section 4 Membership of a State is determined primarily by birth---either (1) from parents who are members or (2) within the territory of the State;---but partly also by consent, as expatriation is ordinarily free
• Section 5 Local differences in laws, within the limits of a State, are largely due to historical causes; how far such differences ought to be retained is a balanced question. Other variations in legislation, and in other kinds of governmental interference, have a reasonable basis in differences of physical conditions

CHAPTER XV

PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL DUTY

• Section 1 The accepted rules of international duty are in the main based on the principle of mutual non-interference: and we may reasonably adopt 0this as the only principle generally applicable to the relations of civilised States. In applying this principle to international relations, special questions arise
• Section 2 (a) From the incomplete definiteness and coherence of States as compared with individuals: for instance, the partial interfusion of nations raises disputed questions as to the determination of membership of a State, and as to the legitimate treatment of resident allens.
• Section 3 Especially in the case of aliens who are fugitive lawbreakers from, or otherwise hostile to, a neighbouring State
• Section 4 (b) The rationale of governmental control over portions of the earths surface is analogous, but not precisely similar, to the rationale of private property in land. Thus special questions arise in determining the legitimate extent of this dominion, and the modes of acquiring it; also as regards the relations of members of different States, in territory not under civilised government
• Section 5 (c) In international relations a contract made under unjust coercion cannot be treated as simply invalid
• Section 6 From the fact that the internal cohesion of States is liable to be broken, difficult questions arise as to the right of other States to intervene

CHAPTER XVI

THE REGULATION OF WAR

• Section 1 If one State seriously infringes the international rights of another, and obstinately refuses reparation, the latter must be held justified in resorting to force, if arbitration is for any valid reason impracticable. And if neighbouring States cannot combine effectively on the side of justice, it only remains to impose impartially on both parties rules limiting the mischief of war
• Section 2 A belligerent must be allowed to inflict on his enemy such mischief as is likely to be effective in disabling him and inducing him to submit; but he may be expected to abstain from such mischief as does not conduce to these ends importantly in proportion to its amount, whether the mischief be personal injuries, or seizure of property: but he can hardly be expected to abstain from levying severe contributions, even on the property of non-combatants
• Section 3 As for neutrals---it is clear that belligerents ought not to injure neutrals, nor neutrals to aid belligerents in their warlike operations: but some difficult questions arise in the effort to reconcile these two principles with each other---and the latter with common humanity---in their practical applications
• Section 4 The regulation of civil war raises the further question when and how far insurgents ought to receive, from their own government or from neutrals, the rights and privileges of ordinary belligerents
• Section 5 Grave difficulties are raised by the question ``how far agreements imposed on a State by an unjust victor are to be held binding''

CHAPTER XVII

INTERNATIONAL LAW AND MORALITY

• Section 1 Among rules of international duty we may distinguish those of which the breach is commonly held to justify force, from those of which the breach is only held to justify disapprobation and complaint
• Section 2 But the distinction between the two is somewhat blurred by the widespread toleration of actual or threatened aggression on behalf of national interest, not justified by recognised rules of international right. For various reasons, too, the definition of international rights must be much more imperfect than that of civil rights
• Section 3 Moreover, what is commonly called International Law differs from Positive Law within a State, and more resembles Positive Morality, in having the distinction obscure, and the transition gradual and indefinite, between rules that are, and rules that ought to be, established
• Section 4 Still, in respect of the process of changing it, International Law occupies a position intermediate between Positive Law and Positive Morality; and certain parts of it have reached a degree of definiteness which makes it resemble the former more than the latter. But this is not the case with the most important rules of international duty

CHAPTER XVIII

PRINCIPLES OF EXTERNAL POLICY

• Section 1 International duty cannot be determined on the basis of exclusive regard for national interest, and must be held paramount in case of conflict with the latter. But it is generally---though perhaps not always---the interest of a State to observe the recognised rules of international duty, so long as it has a reasonable expectation that they will be observed by other States: while in dealing with any State that will not observe them, these recognised restraints must be held to ]w correspondingly relaxed. It is a more doubtful question whether a State ought to risk war to prevent highhanded aggression by another State against a third
• Section 2 Restrictions on free trade between States are inexpedient, economically and politically, for the community formed by the aggregate of the trading States; and though they may in certain cases bring economic gain to the particular State imposing them, they are not on the whole to be recommended;---except possibly by way of retaliation
• Section 3 The free admission of aliens will generally be advantageous; but in certain cireunistances it may be the right policy to place restrictions on it
• Section 4 Extension of territory through conquest, even when it is not to be condemned as injurious to the conquered, is doubtful in policy: the disadvantages and drawbacks require to be carefully estimated in each particular case
• Section 5 Expansion by conquest passes by gradual transitions iuto expansion by colonisation.
• Section 6 Emigration in itself, under ordinary circumstances, is rather to be regulated than systematically promoted by government
• Section 7 except where the emigration is into territory under the control of the same government, so that the disposal of unoccupied lands affords a means of promoting it
• Section 8 The management of the relations between colonists and ``aborigines'' is a matter of much difficulty, requiring careful regulations and restrictions

PART II

CHAPTER XIX

METHODS AND INSTRUMENTS OF GOVERNMENT

• Section 1 When we ask how Government is to be constituted to do the work marked out for it, the need is at once manifest of (1) a Judicial organ to decide whether and by whom laws have been broken, and (2) an Executive organ to prevent and punish such breaches, and enforce reparation for wrongs inflicted by them, to manage the foreign relations of the State, and to levy the necessary taxes. Further, as a security against oppressive taxation, there is need of a Money-granting organ independent of the Executive
• Section 2 The need of Legislation is also clear, in order that legal duties may be definite and ``cognoscible'',
• Section 3 and therefore of a Legislative organ---even if Governmental interference be restricted to the Individualistic minimum
• Section 4 If we admit---as modern States generally do---some amount of ``indirectly individualistic'', ``paternal'', and ``socialistic'' legislation, the need of a continually active Legislature becomes still more palpable; and also the need of a larger and more complex Executive;---though part of the additional work thus rendered necessary may be assigned to semi-public institutions
• Section 5 it is important that Executive functions---whether coercive or non-coereive---should be carefully kept within the limits of the law; and therefore supervised by a legislative organ wholly or mainly distinct from the executive: also the organisation of the Executive should be under the control of the ``money-granting'' organ, which, again, we may assume to be wholly or mainly identical with the Legislature
• Section 6 The Executive organ will therefore be normally sub-ordinate to the Legislature, as is, indeed, implied in the term ``executive'':----though it must be admitted that this terra does not well describe the functions of the organ so called, so far as it deals with foreign affairs
• Section 7 The Judicial, as well as the Executive organ, should be distinct from the Legislature
• Section 8 But, for various reasons, the threefold distribution of Governmental functions among organs distinguished as Legislative, Executive, and Judicial, cannot be made complete
• Section 9 It is an error to think that systematic discussion of the proper construction of these organs is unprofitable because ``constitutions are organic growths''

CHAPTER XX

THE LEGISLATURE

• Section 1 Legal experts should have a large and responsible share in legislation; but representatives periodically elected by the citizens at large should constitute the whole, or a chief part, of the organ of legislation; because such persons are more likely to have empirical knowledge and keen concern for, the legislative needs of the community, than legislators otherwise selected; and their legislation is more likely to be, acceptable to the governed
• Section 2 The representative system is also widely commended---perhaps too confidently---as tending to improve the electorate, intellectually and morally.
• Section 3 Prima facie, the electorate should include all self-supporting sane adults: but the exclusion of some may be justified by special proof (a) that their interests will not suffer, or (b) that they will make a dangerously bad use of the franchise, through intimidation, bribery, or demagogy
• Section 4 Extreme ignorance, crime, and disgraceful conduct, pauperism, bankruptcy, are valid reasons for exclusion: there are also reasons of a different kind for excluding certain classes of employees, especially soldiers. There seem to be no adequate reasons for excluding women as such
• Section 5 The danger of legislation oppressive to the rich is admitted: but the obvious plan of meeting it by allotting more electoral power to persons of wealth and education involves serious disadvantages and drawbacks
• Section 6 The electorate should be divided locally, not by free combination: division into equal single-member constituencies has the advantage of simplicity, but the disadvantage of artificiality. In the ease of electoral divisions with several members, the representation of substantial minorities should be secured by some form of the method of the quota
• Section 7 For the most part, the right to be elected should be extended coincidently with the right to elect: but it seems expedient to keep the post of legislator unsalaried---thus giving an advantage to candidates of independent means
• Section 8 Election in two stages is not to be recommended---except perhaps for a Second Chamber.
• Section 9 The legislative assembly should be of moderate dimensions, working largely by Committees. Initiation of legislation should be free to all members. The necessary quorum requires careful consideration