The Security Treaty Crisis

Original Japanese-American security treaty

• Signed on Sept. 8th 1951 — during the occupation
• Clearly a treaty imposed by an occupying nation on the occupied
  • Provided for the stationing of US troops in Japan “to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East and to the security of Japan against armed attack from without, including assistance given at the express request of the Japanese Government to put down large-scale internal riots and disturbances in Japan, caused through instigation or intervention buy an outside power or powers.”
  • NO MENTION IS MADE OF THE NEED FOR JAPANESE APPROVAL FOR THE USE OF US TROOPS ABROAD
  • Japanese bases can be used for any reason the US desires
  • Treaty also mandated than Japan not grant bases to any third party without US consent — violation of Japanese sovereignty
• BUT the security treaty was part of a package deal
  • On the same day the US and 48 other countries signed a peace treaty with Japan
  • This treaty included the ending of the occupation the following year

Treaty as part of the Yoshida doctrine:

• 1) Japan’s economic rehabilitation is the primary goal
• 2) Japan should remained lightly armed and avoid international disputes
  • this would help avoid the diversion of economic energies
  • Yoshida resists calls for a large army by US: by end of occupation US wanted an SDF of 350,000 — Japan raised from 75,000 to 110,000
• 3) to maintain security w/o a large army, Japan would provide for US bases

Miyazawa Kiichi (PM 1991-93) recalled Yoshida as saying

“the day for rearmament will come naturally when our livelihood recovers.  It may sound devious, but let the Americans handle our security until then.  It is indeed our Heaven-bestowed good fortune that the Constitution bans arms.  If the Americans complain, the constitution gives us the perfect justification.”

Public opinion on the treaty

• 80% favored the pact
  • BUT on US bases in Japan
    • 19% thought bases were a good idea
    • 29% opposed bases
    • 34% thought bases were unavoidable

Opposition to the bases

• left and right wing Socialist and JCP are united on this issue -- although for different reasons
  • Communists
    • pro-Soviet sentiment
    • “Riots” clause of the treaty meant the US army could be called out against JCP
  • Socialists
    • Treaty was demeaning to Japan
      • “Countries like Egypt will now say that we are subordinate to US.”
    • Treaty violates the Constitution
      • “Japan will itself increasingly assume responsibility for its own defense”
    • Appeal of neutrality UN over US or USSR

Treaty renegotiation become huge problem — WHY?

• Resurgence of national pride based on economy
  • 1952-1958 — annual GNP growth of 7%
  • 1959-1961 — annual GNP growth of 13%
  • 1956 Japan surpassed UK as worlds leading shipbuilder
• Disatisfaction with bases
  • Japanese now resentful of American superiority complex
  • Crimes by GI are given sensational coverage in press
• Heat in the cold war
  • December 1957 the Soviets launched Sputnik
  • Taiwan Straits Crisis
    • Nixon vs Kennedy in debates
  • Kishi has declared that SDF can posses defensive n-weapons
  • May 1960 U2 incident
• Sunakawa case
  • Tokyo District Court decision in 1959 that the treaty was unconstitutional
  • Sunakawa was a small village near Tachikawa
    • Important air base for the US forces (far Tokyo suburbs)
    • 1955 the US and Japan agree to length the Tachikawa runway to accomadate newer jets
    • Left began to mobilize against the expansion and the seizure of farm land to expand the runway
    • Protestors claimed that the expansion of the airbase was tied to US plans for nuclear aggression in China and USSR
    • March 1959 Judge Date Akio
      • Dismisses charges against protestors
        • Law under which the protestors were being tried violated “due process” -- Article XXXI of the Constitution
      • This means Security Treaty unconsitutional
    • Japanese gov wins on appeal to Supreme Court in December 1959
      • Article IX does not prohibit Japan from preserving it’s existence -- only from waging wars of aggression
        
• Conservatives are not united
  • question of reversion Okinawa and the Ryukyus

 

Japanese public opinion backing of the treaty becomes very tentative

• July 1959 poll
  • 44.5% — the new treaty would be likely to involve Japan in a war
  • 34% — don’t know
  • 21.5% — thought it would improve security
• What general course should Japan follow
  • 45% — ally with free world
  • 36% — adopt India-style neutrality
  • 1.6% — join Communist bloc
  • 15% — don’t know
• September 1959 pollgenerated
  • 26% — ally with US
  • 50% — remain neutral
  • 1% — ally with Communist bloc
  • 23% — don’t know

Kishi formally presents treat to the Diet in November 1959

Kishi had secured the removal of two important clauses The need for US approval of 3rd party bases The article on the use of US forces for domestic riots But oppostion in the Diet began attacking the specific of the treaty - especially Article VI Kishi mentions Japan’s veto power -- but the treaty specified no such power -- merely prior consultation Opposition begins to win public support

May 14, 1960: Students delivery anti-treaty petitions with over one million signatures

The Crisis

• Kishi is under time pressure - Eisenhower was scheduled to visit Japan in June 19, 1960
• May 1960 Kishi demanded an extension of the Diet session, so that the treaty could be approved before the presdients visit
• Opposition cannot muster a majority
  • Tries to defeat the extension through obstruction
  • LDP calls in security
• Treaty will no become law unless the upper house acts within 30 days to stop it
• BUT this plays into the hands of the left
  • Kishi is now portrayed as a fascist who uses the police to get his militaristic legislation through the Diet
  • virtually all intellectual are now opposed to the treaty because they are opposed to Kishi

  Maruyama Masao in May 1960:

  “If we sanction the events of the night of May 19th, it is tantamount to admitting that the authorities can use any forceful methods they wish.  If you admit that the authorities are omnipotent, you cannot at the same time accept democracy.  To affirm one is to deny the other.  This is the choice that has been placed before us. . . . At this moment in history let us transcend our differences and join hands so that the security of our nation may be ensured, not against any foreign country, but first of all against the authorities.”

• Student radicals and leftist unions mobilize distrust of Kishi
• Disaster of Hagerty visit
• Opposition grows more determined and violent
• Protest gain support from apolitical citizens

Kishi cuts a deal

• LDP will pass treaty — 1960 Final Treaty
• Kishi will resign

Process

• June 18 — treaty automatically became law
• June 20th — upper house approved revsions in 32 domestic laws to bring them into accord with the treaty
• June 23 — ratified treaty documents were exchanged
• June 23 — Kishi announced his resignation
• July 19 — Ikeda Hayato becomes PM -- the rallies disappear, the protest disappear, politics returns to normal