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Are Congressional Leaders Middlepersons or Extremists? Yes.

Influential theories of legislative organization predict that congressional leaders will be selected from the center of their parties. Yet previous research has generally rejected the "middleperson hypothesis," finding leaders to be extremists. We challenged these findings by testing more-appropriate null hypotheses via Monte Carlo simulation. We found that congressional leaders (and leadership candidates as a whole) tend to be closer to their party's median than would occur by chance, but leaders also tend to be selected from the left of the median for Democrats and to the right for Republicans. Compared to the pool of announced candidates for leadership positions, winners are not ideologically distinctive. This result suggests that factors affecting the ideology of leaders tend to operate more at the candidate emergence stage.

A large body of scholarship highlights the significance of party leaders in the U.S. Congress, underscoring the importance of understanding these leaders' ideological characteristics. Leaders are responsible for managing the cartels that dole out rewards and punishments, thereby compelling rank-and-file members to act cohesively (Cox and McCubbins 1993). Some scholars have argued that leaders provide the brand image presented to the electorate in congressional elections (Bibby and Davidson 1967; Cox and McCubbins 1993; Evans and Oleszek 1999). The leadership is responsible for setting the legislative agenda (Cox and McCubbins 2005; Rohde 1991; Sinclair 1983) and negotiating with leaders of the opposing party, both within the chamber and between chambers in conferences (King and Zeckhauser 2002; Peabody 1984). Leaders also appoint negotiators to conference committees and strategists to campaign committees.

Moreover, the study of leadership selection has important implications beyond the halls of Congress. A fundamental feature of democratic governments is the ability of their legislative institutions

to represent citizen preferences. With population-based representation in single-member districts, the House of Representatives attempts to approximate the ideal of representational government. Yet the leadership of the majority party significantly influences the legislative agenda (Cox and McCubbins 2005) and may potentially influence the voting behavior of members. We must determine if the members of the leadership team are representative of their parties (let alone the chamber as a whole) if we wish to ascertain whether American political institutions reflect mass opinion, which some scholars have argued is more centrist than elite opinion (Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope 2004). Indeed, recent discussions regarding the bailout package that Congress crafted to deal with the fall 2008 financial crisis centered on the highly powerful and influential role of congressional leaders. Some observers questioned whether the policy response to the collapse in the global economy was adequately sensitive to mass opinion.[1]

Recent investigations of individual leadership contests have examined the variables that influence voting in leadership elections. This research has been complicated by the fact that, unlike roll-call votes on policy, leadership elections are conducted by secret ballot. Many scholars have had to employ creative research designs to penetrate this secrecy. Analyzing an archived whip count of members' expected votes, Harris (2006) closely examined the 1989 minority whip race and found that conservatives and less senior members were more likely to support Newt Gingrich over Edward Madigan. Similarly, Green's (2006) study of Morris Udall's challenge of Speaker McCormack in 1969 suggested that goal-seeking behavior can be used to predict vote choice in intraparty elections. Green pointed out two limitations of these types of studies: (1) the dependent variable of vote choice relies on proxies, such as whip counts, because the elections are conducted via secret ballot, and (2) the specific case studies examined may be unrepresentative and the results therefore not generalizable to races for other positions or in other time periods.

Other scholars have examined a larger set of leadership races to determine the characteristics of the leaders who eventually emerge.[2] Some of these studies have shown support for the "middleperson theory" (Polser and Rhodes 1997), the extremism hypothesis (Clausen and Wilcox 1987), and multiple ideological types (Gross 1980; Sinclair 1983; Sullivan 1975), while other studies have been inconclusive (Patterson 1963). More recently, research has capitalized on more robust data and methods. For example, Grofman, Koetzle, and McGann's (2002) broad examination of congressional leaders over the past 40 years concluded that both Republicans and Democrats in the

U.S. House select extremist leaders who are ideologically closer to the party mode than to the party median. Using a similar approach, King and Zeckhauser (2002) and Harris and Nelson (2008) determined that the DW-NOMINATE scores of elected leaders have been increasingly falling outside the middle range.

Several other researchers have explored determinants of leadership selection other than ideology, such as subjective assessments of personality and skill (Peabody 1976), experience in lower-level leadership positions (Canon 1989), the ability to build coalitions and manage the legislative agenda (Sinclair 1983, 1995), campaign donations via leadership political action committees (Frisch and Kelley 2008; Green 2008; Green and Harris 2007; Heberlig, Hetherington, and Larson 2006; Powell 2008; Raso 2008), legislative effectiveness and entrepreneurship (Volden and Wiseman 2008; Wawro 2001), cosponsorship behavior (Fowler 2006; Harbridge 2008), and demographic characteristics (Smith 2007).[3] Indeed, these factors may determine which candidates select into contests, as well.

Building on the extant literature, we tested the empirical implications of well-known theories of congressional leadership selection, particularly with respect to ideology. We developed and implemented a set of tests to examine the ideological characteristics of the elected leaders. The article is organized as follows. The first section explains how knowing the ideological characteristics of leaders is important for scholars who wish to evaluate several theories of legislative organization and decision making. The next section provides a broad overview of previous approaches to studying leadership selection and these approaches' limitations. The third section describes our methodology to address these limitations. The fourth section presents and discusses our results. We conclude by summarizing the implications of our findings and discussing potential avenues for future research.

Theoretical Implications Regarding Leadership Ideology

The theoretical basis for most discussions of leadership selection in legislatures is the median-voter theorem (Black 1958). As elucidated by Truman (1959), this theory posits that party leaders will be the "middlemen"[4] of their parties, or ideologically proximate to the median party member, so long as preferences are unidimensional. Subsequent research has offered results consistent with the middleperson proposition, the authors contending that party leaders are agents of party members, who act as principals (Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991;

Rohde 1991; Sinclair 1995). By selecting ideologically centrist[5] leaders, the rank and file can increase the probability that the leadership team implements the preferences of the party as a whole.[6]

The middleperson hypothesis is implied by party cartel theories of legislative organization. In *Legislative Leviathan*, Cox and McCubbins (1993) argued that party leaders solve collective-action dilemmas in Congress by incentivizing reelection-minded members to support and produce legislation that benefits the party as a whole (that is, the party brand), not only their districts. According to Cox and McCubbins, "The collective dilemmas facing a party are 'solved' chiefly through the establishment of party leadership positions that are both attractive and elective. The trick is to induce those who occupy or seek to occupy leadership positions to internalize the collective interests of the party" (134–35). One way to induce such internalization is simply to eject leaders at the beginning of the next session if their actions do not conform to the preferences of party members. But Cox and McCubbins argue that such actions are not easy:

Ousting the incumbent Speaker . . . and installing a new regime cannot be accomplished by a single costless vote: it requires a series of political battles, each with uncertain outcome. While the revolutionary battle rages, the value of deals struck by the old Speaker may be lost to all members of the party. Moreover, when the dust settles and a new regime is in place, the original revolutionaries may or may not have gotten what they wanted. (1993, 131–32)

An easier way to ensure that leaders represent the party's interests is to elect leaders from the median of the party, which is what Cox and McCubbins predicted to occur. To maximize the probability that a leader will be reelected to her or his post:

[the leader] should choose x [vector of actions] equal to the median of the *median Democrat's* district. . . . If maximizing the probability of being elected as party leader requires, let us say, being in the middle of the party's ideological range, then presumably those who *are* in this range and have constituencies that allow or support this position are more likely to win the leadership election. (1993, 128–29)

In *Setting the Agenda*, Cox and McCubbins (2005, 8) extended this cartel theory, arguing that a party selects leaders as agents (or "senior partners") to set the agenda and produce legislative public goods. According to Cox and McCubbins, the main job of majority party leaders is to keep off the floor those bills on which their party will get "rolled" (that is, they must ensure that bills do not pass against the wishes of the majority of the majority party). To guarantee that the majority can exercise negative agenda control, party members

delegate agenda-setting power to multiple veto players (party leaders and committee chairs) who share the ideological views of the median party member: "Whenever a majority of the majority party would like to see a bill blocked, some senior partners will in fact block it, either because *they share the majority's views* or because they feel a fiduciary obligation to do so" (Cox and McCubbins 2005, 42, emphasis ours).

Hypothesis 1 (Middleperson Hypothesis): Elected party leaders should tend to hold ideologies close to those of the party's median voter at the time of the selection.

As we will describe, many authors have empirically rejected the middleperson hypothesis after finding that leaders are drawn from the extremes of the party. Scholars have offered many theoretical reasons to explain this finding. Leadership elections often involve more than two candidates and are sometimes conducted via majority-rule sequential-elimination voting (MRSE). McGann, Grofman, and Koetzle (2002; see also McGann, Koetzle, and Grofman 2002) have demonstrated that the victor should be closest to the modal[7] voter in MRSE electoral systems; an empirical regularity is that the mode is located at the extreme points of the distribution.[8] Clausen and Wilcox (1987) posited the policy partisanship theory of leadership selection: leaders are drawn from the ideological location with the greatest concentration of members (namely, the extremes in skewed preference distributions), who, because of their ideological similarities, can coordinate on a representative. King and Zeckhauser (2002) argued that leaders tend to be extremists because the party selects its best and toughest negotiators. Hence, King and Zeckhauser also employed a principal-agent argument, but they used it to explain why extremists are selected. Finally, Heberlig, Hetherington, and Larson (2006) have offered a potential answer to the puzzle of why the median voter would select an extreme leadership candidate above a centrist one: members' fund-raising efforts for the party exert significant influence on their probability of leadership selection, and extremists have become increasingly more likely than their more moderate colleagues to use money on behalf of colleagues in order to attain leadership positions.

Hypothesis 2 (Directional Hypothesis): Elected party leaders should tend to hold ideologies on the extreme side of the party median at the time of selection, Democrats being more liberal and Republicans more conservative.

Methodological Approaches of Previous Research

In this section, we describe the limitations of the previous methodological approaches to the study of leadership selection. To do so, we focus on individual, representative studies in detail.

Some studies have compared proportions of leaders on different sides of the party median. For example, Clausen and Wilcox (1987) calculated the ratio of the number of leaders selected on the extreme side of the party median to the number of leaders selected on the side closer to the entire-chamber median. The ideological scores were based on key votes the authors identified. Clausen and Wilcox concluded that leaders are more likely to come from the extreme side. This investigation had two flaws: (1) Clausen and Wilcox conducted no formal hypothesis test to assess if the results would be just as likely to emerge by chance alone, and (2) the study is not a proper test of the middleperson hypothesis, because it does not depend at all on the selected leaders' ideological distances from their party medians.

Other studies have pooled sets of leaders for comparison. For instance, Grofman, Koetzle, and McGann (2002) compared the median ideology of leadership teams against the party median, using Mann-Whitney tests each year. The authors found that leaders are more extreme than the party median. Analyzing leadership teams is problematic, however, since the middleperson theory applies to individual leadership elections. Second, Grofman, Koetzle, and McGann compared the average ideological scores of a leadership team against the party median for every single year that the team was in power. Our analysis only involves the leader's ideology at the point of selection. Since it is very hard to dislodge leaders (Harris 2006) and they are mainly removed as the result of scandal or electoral failure (and not ideological differences), once a leader is elected, he or she can effectively occupy that position for as long as he or she wishes. Hence, it is more sensible to examine a leader's ideology only at the point of selection, as opposed to every single year.[9] Moreover, Grofman, Koetzle, and McGann only examined ideology scores from a single year, whereas caucus members observe candidates' entire voting histories at the time of an election.[10]

Other scholars have taken a descriptive approach. Heberlig, Hetherington, and Larson (2006) plotted the difference between the DW-NOMINATE scores of the parties' floor leaders along with the distance between average members of the party caucuses. The authors showed that leader polarization has increased at a faster rate than caucus polarization over time (see also Theriault 2008, 139). Unfortunately, these authors did not conduct any hypothesis tests to distinguish such

changes from noise. Harris and Nelson (2008) examined the percentile ranking of each leader's DW-NOMINATE score and assessed whether these percentiles have changed over time. Harris and Nelson proposed no statistical test, however, and they arbitrarily chose members located between the 40th and 60th percentiles as their middleperson selections. Becker and Moscardelli (2008) used a similar approach to analyze the extremism of committee chairs, classifying them by tercile as "extremist," "middleperson," or "bipartisan" according to the chairs' DW-NOMINATE scores. Becker and Moscardelli performed no statistical tests, either; they simply observed whether or not the modal leader fit into one of the three discreet categories. Kiewiet and McCubbins (1991) examined each leader's average NOMINATE score over the leader's tenure in the position and then computed the leader's percentile within the party. Kiewiet and McCubbins did not conduct statistical tests, but they did state that most leaders' percentiles are reasonably close to 50 and leaders can therefore can be considered middlepersons.

More fundamentally, though, the majority of these analyses considered not only leadership selections but also the ideology of leaders (or leadership teams) for each year or Congress in which the leaders served. By analyzing leaders every year rather than simply at the point of selection, researchers run the serious risk of confounding influences on leadership selection with the effects that being selected as a leader may have on a member's subsequent voting behavior. For example, if members' voting becomes more extreme *as a result of* assuming leadership posts, then one could conclude that more-extreme members are more likely to be chosen for leadership posts, even if selected leaders tend to be moderates. Similarly, the distribution of party members may change over time, meaning that a leader's post-selection ideological position is determined by colleagues who did not select that leader.

A final limitation of all of these studies is that they only analyzed the *winners* of leadership races. We chose to examine the members who *lost* leadership races also, because when one evaluates hypotheses of leadership selection, one must understand the alternatives available to the caucus. In sum, there has not existed a comprehensive, definitive examination of the ideological characteristics of congressional leaders. We developed a methodological approach to fill this lacuna.

Method

In this section, we describe the procedures we used to test hypotheses about the selection of party leaders in the House and Senate. Our analyses tested the two hypotheses that have been discussed

extensively in the literature: the middleperson hypothesis and the directional hypothesis. The most prominent version of the directional hypothesis predicts that leaders will come from the liberal extremes for the Democratic Party and the conservative extremes for the Republican Party (see, for example, Grofman, Koetzle, and McGann 2002 and King and Zeckhauser 2002).

These theories (particularly the middleperson theory) often rely on simplifying assumptions about deterministic voting by members. Real-world tests should clearly avoid such oversimplifications. Rather than testing whether the simplified theory is exactly true, we should ask if the general logic of the theory tends to govern events in the real political world. The question then is not whether selected leaders are, for example, the *exact* median of the chamber, but instead whether members tend to be selected from closer to the median than we would ordinarily expect to occur by chance. Similarly, we should not interpret the directional hypothesis so strictly as to expect the *most* extreme member of each party to be selected as a leader, but rather to expect leaders to be selected from, on average, closer to the party's extremes than would be likely to occur by chance.

Our statistical procedures avoid unproven assumptions about the distribution of party membership and instead rely upon the actual distribution of ideology within each party. Specifically, we performed Monte Carlo simulations to calculate the actual distribution of the test statistic under the null hypothesis. To test the middleperson hypothesis with a given set of leadership selections, we used as our test statistic the average absolute ideological distance from the leader's ideology to the party's median ideology in the Congress that the leader was chosen. For a set of $i=1,...,N$ leadership selections, our test statistic is

$$T_{middle} = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^{N} |l_i - median(X_i)| \qquad (1)$$

where l_i is leader i's ideology and X_i is the set of the ideologies of all members of leader i's party during the Congress that leader i was selected for the leadership position.

To test the hypothesis that leaders tend to be selected from closer to the party median than would likely occur by chance (as implied by the middleperson theory), we needed to formally define the distribution that our test statistic would take if the null hypothesis were true: what would the distribution of T_{middle} be if each leader were randomly selected from the party membership for the Congress in which that leader was chosen? To answer this question, we used Monte Carlo simulation (for

an example of this technique applied to tests of congressional committee composition, see Groseclose 1994). We first selected a hypothetical leader for each leadership position in our dataset, choosing leaders randomly from the party's membership as a whole during the Congress in which the leadership selection took place; each member had an equal probability of selection. We then calculated the value of our test statistic T_{middle} for this hypothetical set of leaders, taking the average of the absolute ideological distance between each hypothetical leadership choice and the corresponding party's median for that Congress. We repeated this procedure 100,000 times, producing 100,000 random draws from the distribution that our test statistic would follow if the null hypothesis were true. We could then easily assess, for a given set of observed leadership selections, how often the leaders would be at least as close to their party's median on average under the null hypothesis of random selection. We called this *p*-value for the test of our middleperson hypothesis P_{middle}. If this proportion is extremely low, then we must reject the null hypothesis in favor of our alternative hypothesis that leaders tend to be chosen from close to the party's median.

   To test the directional hypothesis—that party leaders tend to be selected systematically in one direction from the party median—we used the same nonparametric, simulation-based technique, but we changed our test statistic. Instead of examining the average absolute distance from each selected leader to the appropriate party median, we considered the average difference between the selected leader and her or his party median. If we use the same notation as in equation (1), then our test statistic becomes

$$T_{directional} = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^{N} l_i - median(X_i) \qquad (2)$$

$T_{directional}$ provides a measure of the ideological tendency of chosen leaders, measuring whether observed leaders are likely to be farther to the left or the right of their party's median, on average. By comparing $T_{directional}$ to its simulated distribution under the null hypothesis of random selection, we can determine if the observed value provides strong evidence against random selection of leaders and for a tendency to choose leaders who are on one side of the median in particular. If the observed average difference between selected leaders and party medians is significantly different than would happen under the null of random leadership selection, then we can conclude that leaders are more ideologically liberal or conservative than would occur by chance alone.

We defined $P_{directional}$ as the probability, under the null hypothesis of random leadership selection, that we would observe an average (signed) difference between chosen leaders and their party medians that was at least as far from 0 as the average we observed in our data.[11]

For any single leadership selection, there is a direct trade-off between support for the middleperson hypothesis and support for the directional hypothesis. If a leader is selected close to the party median, then he or she is not near the extremes of the party. Consider the two most recent House Speaker selections. (Note that these are only examples; we later report results from a full dataset.) We can calculate for each selected leader how close in absolute terms he or she is to the median by calculating T_{middle} for that one race. For example, Figure 1 shows that Nancy Pelosi had a DW-NOMINATE score of −.515 in the 110th House. The distribution of Democrats in the 110th House, depicted in the histogram in the left pane of Figure 1, has a median of −.42. Therefore, T_{middle} is simply $|-.515 - (-.42)| = .095$. For this race, P_{middle} equals the proportion of Democrats in the 110th House who had a DW-NOMINATE score at least as close to the median as Pelosi's score: $P_{middle} = 111/235 = .47$. In other words, almost half of the Democratic representatives at the time of Pelosi's selection were at least as close to the median as she was. By contrast, approximately 24% of the 106th House's Republican membership was at least as close to the party median as Dennis Hastert (as shown in the right pane of Figure 1). Testing the directional hypothesis for any one race, we would use a similar procedure but instead of calculating the proportion of party members who were at least as close to the party median as the selected leader, we would calculate the proportion of members who were at least as far from the median (in either direction). For Pelosi, 53% of Democratic members were at least as far from the party median as she was (note that P_{middle} and $P_{directional}$ actually sum to slightly greater than 1 because they each involve weak inequalities, counting the selected leader in both). On the other hand, approximately 76% of Hastert's party was at least as far from the party median as he was. Thus, for individual races, as P_{middle} increases, $P_{directional}$ decreases, and vice versa.

It is important to note, however, that when one analyzes multiple leadership races together, support for the middleperson and directional hypotheses is *not* mutually exclusive. These two seemingly contradictory hypotheses can be simultaneously confirmed for multiple races, because selected leaders may be relatively close to the party median but also generally come from one side of the ideological spectrum. If the null hypothesis were true, then over the course of many random selections from a party's membership, leaders would be selected from the right of the median as often as they were selected from the left. This scenario

FIGURE 1
Recent House Speakers with Party Ideology Distributions

110th House Democrats
Speaker Nancy Pelosi

106th House Republicans
Speaker Dennis Hastert

Note: Panels show histograms of DW-NOMINATE scores for party members for chamber, Congress, and party indicated in plot titles. Solid vertical lines denote the position of the selected leader, while dashed vertical lines show the position of the median legislator in the party.

highlights a key difference between these two hypotheses that may be easily missed. The middleperson hypothesis deals only with *absolute* distances from the median. The relevant information for testing this hypothesis is how far, on average, leaders are from the party's median. Whether all leaders tend to be to the left, all tend to be to the right, or they are equally likely to be selected from either side is not relevant. By contrast, the directional hypothesis pertains to average (signed) differences between the party median and the selected leader. In other words, how much more liberal or conservative on average are observed leaders than what would be expected under the null hypothesis? Thus, the middleperson hypothesis deals with general proximity to the party median, while the directional hypothesis predicts that leaders tend to be selected from a particular ideological direction beyond their party's median position. Previous scholarship on this topic has conceived of the middleperson and directional hypotheses as both theoretically and empirically incompatible. As we will demonstrate, they are not.

Results

In this section, we present our main findings. We first evaluate the middleperson and directional hypotheses of leadership selection. We then assess the predictive role of ideology in determining winners

of contested races, and we analyze the ideological characteristics of leadership aspirants. We also describe the data used for each analysis.

Testing the Middleperson and Directional Hypotheses

The data consist of the set of winners of open leadership contests (that is, the selected leaders), including uncontested races. For the House, we collected data on elected party leaders, Speakers, and whips (56th–110th Congresses) from various editions of the *CQ Almanac.* We also gathered data regarding all other offices (conference chair, conference vice-chair, conference secretary, policy committee chair, research committee chair, and campaign committee chair) for the 94th–110th Congresses (Amer 2007a).[12] For the Senate, we used data on elected leaders and whips (66th–110th Congresses) reported in various editions of the *CQ Almanac,* as well as data regarding all other offices (conference chair, conference vice-chair, conference secretary, policy committee chair, and campaign committee chair) for the 94th–110th Congresses (Amer 2007b).

To measure members' ideology (as well as the positions of party medians for each Congress), we used the widely employed ideal-point estimates produced by the DW-NOMINATE procedure (Carroll et al. 2008). DW-NOMINATE locates each member of Congress on what can generally be considered the primary liberal-conservative dimension of political discourse in American politics.[13] These measures are constructed so that they are comparable across congressional sessions and they take into account not only members' votes in a single session of Congress, but also members' previous voting histories. The ideal-point estimates (we used the first-dimension DW-NOMINATE coordinates) allow members' ideological positions to move across time, restricting this movement to a linear trend across congressional sessions. DW-NOMINATE scores are very highly correlated with ideal points estimated using other statistical approaches, such as Bayesian ideal-point estimation and factor analysis (see Clinton, Jackman, and Rivers 2004). In our robustness checks, we replicated the analyses using W-NOMINATE scores.

To test the middleperson hypothesis that congressional party leaders tend to have ideologies closer to their party medians, we used the simulation-based techniques. For each leadership race in our dataset, we noted the congressional session and party for that race and generated a hypothetical party leader by randomly choosing a member from the party's full membership during that session of Congress. We then recorded the average absolute ideological distance from each of

FIGURE 2
Monte Carlo Simulations Testing Middleperson Hypothesis

Note: Figure shows simulated distributions of T_{middle} under the null hypothesis of random leadership selection from the party's full membership. Vertical lines denote observed values of T_{middle} for House and Senate. In both cases, the observed average absolute distance between selected leaders and party medians is significantly lower than would be expected to occur by chance.

the simulated leaders to the party's median. We repeated this process 100,000 times in order to approximate the distribution that our test statistic T_{middle} would follow under the null hypothesis. Figure 2 shows a histogram of these simulations for both the House and Senate, along with the observed average absolute distances from the selected leaders to their party medians (denoted by vertical lines). As these histograms clearly show, the observed absolute distances from selected leaders to their party medians are far out in the left tail of the simulated distributions for both the House and Senate. We would expect leaders to be significantly farther from their party's medians, on average, if they were selected randomly (with each party member having an equal chance of winning the office). In other words, the leaders who were actually chosen tended to be much closer to their party's median than would be likely to occur by chance.

Contrary to much of the extant literature, these findings lead us to reject the null hypothesis that leaders are randomly selected from their parties in favor of the alternative hypothesis that leaders are proximate to the party median. The first row of Table 1 provides the main results for all races in both chambers, reporting leaders' absolute distances from the party medians. In the House, the average leader's ideology (as measured by DW-NOMINATE) is .102 units away from her or his

party's median. We therefore soundly reject the null that the leader is randomly selected from the party ($p = .002$). If leaders were randomly selected from the party's full membership, then we would only observe a set of leaders this far from the median approximately once per 500 selections. Similarly, in the Senate, the average leader is located .122 units, in absolute terms, away from the party median, and we reject the null of random selection at $p = .004$.

Breaking these tests down by the leadership position (Speaker, leader, whip, or other), we see that the conclusions for most offices are similar (p-values at or near conventional significance levels), with a few exceptions. Most notably, we cannot reject the null hypothesis for House Speakers. This result seems puzzling, because the Speaker is the highest office in the House, but this result is possibly due to the voting behavior of members *after* they have been selected as Speaker (we address this issue in the "Robustness Checks" section). Additionally, until the 1990s, Speakers generally did not vote on legislation, a fact that might affect their DW-NOMINATE scores. Finally, because Speakers technically are voted on by the chamber at large, preference-based theories (as posited, for instance, in Krehbiel 1993 and 1998) would predict Speakers to be located proximate to the *chamber* median, not the party median. Liberal Republicans or conservative Democrats could threaten to vote with the opposing party unless Speakers are chosen to reflect their moderate preferences. In the limit, this dynamic could cause the selection of the floor median.

In the lower half of Table 1, we present results for the hypothesis tests for Democrats and Republicans. For both parties in both chambers, we reject the hypothesis that leaders are selected randomly from the set of members (at $p < .04$ in all cases); instead we conclude that leaders are systematically selected from closer to the party median than would occur by chance. Deconstructing the results by party and specific office, we see that many of these results remain significant, but several show higher p-values. This trend is not surprising, however, if we consider the relatively small sample sizes that result from the increasingly specific categorizations.

Our second hypothesis involves not how far in absolute distance leaders tend to be from their party medians, but rather whether leaders tend to be more liberal or more conservative, on average, than they would be according to the null hypothesis of random selection. Or, to put it differently, we needed to assess whether leaders tend to be selected from one ideological direction in particular beyond their party's median. We calculated the average difference between the ideology of selected leaders and their party medians. A positive difference suggests

TABLE 1
Testing the Middleperson Hypothesis (Elected Leaders)

	House	Senate
All Races	.102 (.002, 152)	.122 (.004, 84)
Speaker	.132 (.648, 22)	—————
Leader	.099 (.080, 39)	.077 (<.001, 26)
Whip	.101 (.053, 40)	.129 (.116, 32)
Other Offices	.099 (.017, 51)	.158 (.390, 26)

	House Democrats	House Republicans	Senate Democrats	Senate Republicans
All Races	.106 (.005, 74)	.099 (.026, 78)	.122 (.015, 30)	.134 (.038, 54)
Speaker	.130 (.415, 14)	.135 (.024, 8)	—————	—————
Leader	.114 (.252, 23)	.078 (.065, 16)	.077 (.001, 11)	.082 (.003, 15)
Whip	.099 (.025, 24)	.104 (.241, 16)	.129 (.193, 18)	.136 (.221, 14)
Other Offices	.114 (.214, 13)	.078 (.319, 38)	.158 (.548, 1)	.163 (.440, 25)

Note: Cell entries show observed values of T_{middle}, the average absolute distance of elected leaders from party median. *P*-values from Monte Carlo simulations of leaders from full party membership, as well as cell counts, appear in parentheses.

that leaders tend to be more conservative than their party median, on average; a negative difference means that leaders are more liberal, on average, than the party median. As in the tests of the middleperson hypothesis, we compared these values to the distribution they would take under the null hypothesis of random leadership selection from the party's full membership.

Figure 3 shows the simulated distributions of $T_{directional}$ for the House and Senate, for Democrats and Republicans. Because we may expect Democratic and Republican leaders to have opposing directional tendencies, we present these results by party. Clearly, the Democratic

FIGURE 3
Monte Carlo Simulations Testing Directional Hypothesis

Note: Figure shows simulated distributions of $T_{directional}$ under the null hypothesis of random leadership selection from the party's full membership. Vertical lines denote observed values of $T_{directional}$ for Democrats and Republicans in the House and Senate.

leaders are, on average, significantly to the left of the party median, with the observed statistic falling far out in the left tail of the distribution—much farther than would likely be observed under the null hypothesis. If leaders were randomly selected from the party's membership as a whole, then the average difference between leaders' ideology and their party medians' would rarely ever be this far to the left. The results for Republicans in both the House and Senate are reversed, with $T_{directional}$ falling in the far right tail of the statistic's null distribution.

TABLE 2
Testing the Directional Hypothesis (Elected Leaders)

	House Democrats	House Republicans	Senate Democrats	Senate Republicans
All Races	−.097 (<.001, 74)	.044 (.013, 78)	−.059 (.092, 30)	.048 (.095, 54)
Speaker	−.128 (.008, 14)	.030 (.513, 8)	_____	_____
Leader	−.109 (.002, 23)	.065 (.080, 16)	−.043 (.432, 11)	.039 (.459, 15)
Whip	−.093 (.012, 24)	.074 (.038, 16)	−.073 (.118, 18)	.040 (.471, 14)
Other Offices	−.050 (.315, 13)	−.025 (.342, 38)	.016 (.947, 1)	.057 (.200, 25)

Note: Cell entries show observed values of $T_{directional}$, the average signed distance of elected leaders from party median in table. *P*-values from Monte Carlo simulations of leaders from full party membership, as well as cell counts, appear in parentheses.

Table 2 presents the results of these hypothesis tests. With respect to directional (that is, signed) distances from the party medians, we found that Democratic leaders are directionally closer to the leftmost end of their party and Republican leaders are closer to the rightmost end of theirs. Table 2 and Figure 3 present the results for all positions. The average Democratic leaders in the House and Senate are located .097 and .059 units, respectively, to the left of the party median. Among Republicans, the average leaders in the House and Senate are located .044 and .048 units, respectively, to the right of the party median. For all cases, we reject the null of random selection at $p < .10$ or below. The findings for the House show stronger statistical significance, and we should note that the number of observed leadership selections for the Senate is much smaller (88 in the Senate versus 157 in the House). Similar patterns manifest for the individual leadership positions, although they sometimes have difficulty achieving statistical significance, given the small sample sizes in some subgroups. For instance, there is only one Senate Democrat in our dataset who was elected to a position other than leader or whip.

How do we reconcile the seemingly disparate results from the absolute distance and signed-distance analyses? As we previously mentioned, leaders can be selected from close to the party median, but

there may be a tendency for members to prefer leaders from a particular side of the median. Having properly stated the null hypotheses, we were able to find support for both the middleperson and directional hypotheses. These two theories are not mutually exclusive, either theoretically or empirically. Party leaders in Congress tend to have ideologies closer to those of their party medians. It is also the case that Democratic party leaders tend to be more liberal and Republican leaders more conservative, on average, than would be likely to occur by chance.[14]

While the purpose of the present article is to explore the basic role of ideology in congressional leadership selection, researchers may reasonably suspect that leadership selection varies according to other factors, such as the level of partisan polarization or the strength of party leadership relative to committees. Theories of conditional party government suggest that parties may be more willing to select ideologically extreme leaders when the parties are more homogeneous and when there are larger ideological differences between the two parties (Aldrich and Rohde 1998; Rohde 1991). Also, institutional arrangements, such as the level of committee power, may affect how attractive party leadership positions are and, hence, who chooses to run for these positions. When we separated the analyses by different eras of congressional polarization and institutional trends, we found substantively similar results to those already presented.[15] For the purposes of this simple analysis (described in the online Appendix at http://webspace. utexas.edu/sjessee/www/research-files/congress-leadership-appendix. pdf), we treated sessions of Congress before the fall of Speaker Cannon (61st Congress) as polarized and those between the 61st and 93d Congresses as low-polarization years. "Postreform" Congresses after the 93d were also considered polarized. Our results for both the middleperson and directional hypothesis tests are similar across the two most recent congressional eras ("textbook" and modern polarized). Employing different break points, such as the 100th Congress for House leadership races within the Democratic Party (when the centralization of power was completed under Speaker Wright), yielded somewhat suggestive, but inconclusive results. Although these results do not necessarily rule out the possibility that majority status, partisan polarization levels, or institutional trends may affect the dynamics of leadership selection, they do suggest that the overall results presented here are fairly robust to differing circumstances of congressional politics. For broader discussions of historical trends in congressional polarization, see Han and Brady's (2007) work and Theriault's (2008) *Party Polarization in Congress*.

TABLE 3
Testing the Middleperson Hypothesis (Candidates Only)

	House	Senate
All Races	.107 (.257, 70)	.132 (.577, 36)
Leaders	.129 (.542, 9)	.044 (.210, 5)
Whip	.140 (.382, 10)	.086 (.643, 5)
Other Offices	.097 (.260, 51)	.146 (.665, 26)

	House Democrats	House Republicans	Senate Democrats	Senate Republicans
All Races	.113 (.568, 23)	.105 (.186, 47)	.056 (.333, 4)	.142 (.626, 32)
Leaders	.144 (.799, 5)	.110 (.329, 4)	.030 (.500, 2)	.054 (.315, 3)
Whip	.169 (.625, 5)	.111 (.251, 5)	.126 (1, 1)	.076 (.374, 4)
Other Offices	.08 (.384, 13)	.103 (.292, 38)	.082 (.500, 1)	.151 (.667, 25)

Note: Cell entries show observed values of T_{middle}, the average absolute distance of elected leaders from party median. *P*-values from Monte Carlo simulations of leaders from announced candidates, as well as cell counts, appear in parentheses.

The Influence of Ideology among Leadership Candidates

We have articulated the ideological characteristics of selected leaders relative to their party as a whole. We now compare the ideology of these elected leaders to the ideologies of the other candidates who ran for these leadership posts. We utilized a dataset that consists of all members from both parties who ran in leadership elections (that is, all candidates who formally ran for leadership positions for all offices, including uncontested races) in the House and Senate, both winners and losers, between the 94th and 110th Congresses (Amer 2007a, 2007b).[16]

Table 3 presents simulation results of the absolute distance measures for the complete set of contested leadership races in both chambers from 1974 to 2007. For these analyses, we used the same approach as in our tests of the middleperson hypothesis, except we simulated the distribution of T_{middle} from only the list of candidates for each leadership contest, rather than from the entire party membership at the time of each leadership selection. Hence, the nonparametric tests

TABLE 4
Testing the Directional Hypothesis (Candidates Only)

	House Democrats	House Republicans	Senate Democrats	Senate Republicans
All Races	−.029 (.266, 23)	−.083 (.097, 47)	−.037 (.377, 4)	.049 (.095, 32)
Leaders	.039 (.735, 5)	−.079 (.357, 4)	−.030 (.665, 2)	.054 (.315, 3)
Whip	−.069 (.415, 5)	.011 (.917, 5)	−.126 (.500, 1)	.039 (.459, 4)
Other Offices	−.010 (.714, 13)	−.096 (.132, 38)	.038 (1, 1)	.050 (.178, 25)

Note: Cell entries show observed values of $T_{directional}$, the average signed distance of elected leaders from party median in table. *P*-values from Monte Carlo simulations of leaders from announced candidates only, as well as cell counts, appear in parentheses.

assessed whether the winning candidate was closer to the median than a randomly selected *candidate* was, not a randomly selected member of the party. As shown by Table 3, we cannot reject any tests on the basis of the results for both chambers and all offices. In other words, the winners of leadership elections do not appear to be any closer than the losers are to the party medians.

In Table 4, we present an analogous set of results for the signed-distance measure $T_{directional}$, which allowed us to test the directional hypothesis for the announced candidates for each party leadership position. In only 2 of these 16 tests can we reject the null hypothesis, even if we resort to the relatively high threshold of $p < .10$. Given this significance level, we would expect to observe nearly the same results by chance alone if the null hypothesis were actually true in all cases. This finding suggests that winners of party leadership contests are not ideologically different from other candidates in terms of their proximity to the party median or their average ideological direction from it.

The Ideological Characteristics of Leadership Aspirants

Ideological proximity to the party median and ideological extremity (being more liberal or conservative than the party median for Democrats or Republicans, respectively) are both associated with leadership selection for the full party membership. But these factors are *not* associated with selection for the pool of candidates who choose to run in leadership elections. In this section, we attempt to clarify this

issue by examining the ideology of leadership election candidates (both winners and losers) as compared to the ideology of the party's full membership. We will show that this pattern of results emerges because the logic of both the middleperson and directional hypotheses applies to all leadership candidates, not only the eventual winners. In other words, the members who decide to run for these positions tend to come from similar ideological locations—proximate to the middleperson but with a tendency to come from the right (left) of the median if they are Republicans (Democrats).

We conducted the same tests of the middleperson hypothesis as before, but this time we calculated our test statistic T_{middle} by finding the average absolute ideological distance between the party median and each candidate in each leadership election. We then simulated the distribution of this statistic under the null hypothesis by first randomly selecting a full slate of candidates (with a slate size equal to the number of announced candidates) for each leadership contest. For each race, we noted the average absolute distance between each announced candidate and the relevant party median. Finally, we computed the average of these quantities over all leadership races in our sample as our observed test statistic. Our question, then, is whether candidates are, on average, closer to their party's median than we would expect under the null hypothesis. As Table 5 shows, the results are strikingly similar to those presented in Table 1 for the ultimate victors. In the House, the average candidate has an ideal point that is .107 units away from the party median, and we can soundly reject the null of random selection in favor of the middleperson hypothesis (p = .002). Similarly, in the Senate, the average leader is located .122 units (in absolute terms) away from the party median, and we can reject the null of random selection at p = .006. We find similar results when we bifurcate the data by party. Again, several of the results for specific offices do not reach conventional significance levels, but this limitation is not surprising with the relatively small sample sizes for these increasingly specific categorizations.

We also tested the directional hypothesis with respect to the entire set of candidates, assessing whether the average candidate for a leadership position tends to have an ideology that is either more liberal or conservative than one would expect to occur by chance. For this test, we determined the average (signed) distance from the party median to each of the announced candidates in a given leadership race. We then calculated the average of this quantity over all leadership races in our dataset, giving us our statistic, $T_{directional}$. Table 6 presents these results. Democratic leaders in the House are located .049 units, on average, to the left of the party median, almost permitting us to reject the null

TABLE 5
Testing the Middleperson Hypothesis (Candidate Averages)

	House	Senate
All Races	.107 (.002, 70)	.126 (.006, 36)
Leaders	.130 (.447, 9)	.063 (.001, 5)
Whip	.144 (.688, 10)	.079 (.021, 5)
Other Offices	.095 (<.001, 51)	.151 (.207, 26)

	House Democrats	House Republicans	Senate Democrats	Senate Republicans
All Races	.106 (.009, 23)	.107 (.029, 43)	.070 (.096, 4)	.133 (.012, 32)
Leader	.132 (.454, 5)	.127 (.512, 4)	.061 (.116, 2)	.064 (.002, 3)
Whip	.156 (.714, 5)	.130 (.567, 5)	.109 (.592, 1)	.073 (.015, 2)
Other Offices	.078 (<.001, 13)	.102 (.014, 38)	.052 (.177, 1)	.155 (.236, 25)

Note: Cell entries show observed values of T_{middle}, the average absolute distance of leadership candidates from party median. *P*-values from Monte Carlo simulations of candidate pool average ideology from full party membership, as well as cell counts, appear in parentheses. No contested races for Speaker of the House occurred during our data's time span.

hypothesis in favor of the directional hypothesis ($p = .062$). Similar results arise for Republican leaders in the House, except that these leaders are located, on average, .058 units to the right ($p < .001$). Results for the Senate are more ambiguous. We cannot reject the null hypothesis in any case, as we obtained fairly large *p*-values for both Democrats and Republicans. This pattern suggests that the candidate production process in the Senate does not systematically favor candidates who are located to one particular side of the party median.

Overall, these findings make the earlier pattern of results appear quite sensible. Because the candidates, like the eventual winners, tend to have relatively centrist ideologies and—at least in the House—are located to the outside of their party's median, on average (to the left for Democrats, to the right for Republicans), it is unsurprising that winners do not hold ideologies that are atypical of the overall pool of leadership candidates. Legislators who are located near and to the outside of their

TABLE 6
Testing the Directional Hypothesis (Candidate Averages)

	House Democrats	House Republicans	Senate Democrats	Senate Republicans
All Races	−.049 (.062, 23)	.058 (<.001, 43)	−.012 (.779, 4)	.009 (.756, 32)
Leaders	−.033 (.534, 5)	.120 (.029, 4)	.003 (.961, 2)	.024 (.783, 3)
Whip	−.063 (.222, 5)	.120 (.035, 5)	−.026 (.777, 1)	−.021 (.756, 2)
Other Offices	−.050 (.142, 13)	.043 (.021, 38)	−.036 (.694, 1)	.012 (.719, 25)

Note: Cell entries show observed values of $T_{directional}$, the average signed distance of leadership candidates from party median in table. *P*-values from Monte Carlo simulations of candidate pool average ideology from full party membership, as well as cell counts, appear in parentheses. No contested races for Speaker of the House occurred during our data's time span.

party median tend to be chosen as leaders, so it is mostly this sort of member who chooses to run in these races in the first place. Cox and McCubbins (1993, 130) predicted such an empirical pattern:

A member whose constituency interests dictate something rather far from the competitively optimal platforms in the uncovered set is less likely to *seek* leadership positions— because implementing the optimal policies would be electorally hazardous—and also less likely to *win* those positions—because other members of the party will recognize the constituency conflict and therefore doubt the member's reliability in office.

One potential explanation for this pattern is that potential candidates look ahead and assess their chances.[17] Legislators with ideological positions slightly to the outside of their party's median may see a significant potential for victory and thus be more likely to declare themselves as candidates. Members from competitive districts (who tend to be at the ideological center of the chamber) may see being a leader as hindering their ability to project a moderate image and therefore may be less likely to seek internal advancement. As Cox and McCubbins (1993, 132) observed, "Other things equal, party leaders are more likely to come from safe seats than from marginal seats." Sinclair (1983, 2005) argued that party leaders are "inclusive" in their appointments, seeking to achieve ideological and demographic diversity to satisfy multiple factions within the party, but our results suggest that many members on the lower rungs of the leadership team may be aware that they will have a difficult time rising up the ranks and thus they do not become aspirants for higher office.

To summarize, our study of congressional leaders and leadership contests produced the following four findings:

1. Elected leaders are, on balance, ideologically proximate to their party's median.

2. Democratic and Republican leaders tend to have ideologies that are, on average, further to the left and right, respectively, of their party's median than one would predict to occur by chance.

3. Elected leaders, compared to losing candidates, do not seem to be systematically close to the median or farther toward the exterior wing of their party than would likely occur by chance.

4. The average ideology of announced candidates for each office tends to be both closer to the party median and farther toward the exterior of the party's membership than would likely happen under the null hypothesis of random candidate selection from the party's full membership.

Combining these four results, we conclude that leaders in Congress tend to be among the middlepersons of their parties but also show a tendency to be more to the "outside" of the party median—more conservative for Republicans and more liberal for Democrats.[18] This result is likely the consequence of the endogenous selection of leadership candidates based on their ideological positions, not a matter of the dominant power of member ideology when the parties select from among the candidates formally competing in a given leadership contest. Our findings suggest that the most important factors influencing the ideology of congressional party leadership operate at the candidate emergence stage rather than at the leader selection phase.

Robustness Checks

The results of several robustness checks are presented in the online Appendix (http://webspace.utexas.edu/sjessee/www/research-files/congress-leadership-appendix.pdf). The first set of checks focuses on our choice of DW-NOMINATE scores over other alternatives. The main benefit of using DW-NOMINATE scores for our purposes is that the distances between legislators are comparable across different sessions of Congress and take into account each legislator's full previous voting history when estimating her or his ideology score for a given

Congress. These properties are desirable because we formulated our test statistics by taking averages of the distances or absolute distances from party medians for multiple leadership races in different years. Despite the benefits of DW-NOMINATE scores, some cautions are in order. Specifically, the dynamic nature of the DW-NOMINATE estimation process allows a legislator's voting behavior in a given session of Congress to influence that legislator's estimated ideology in a previous Congress. The linear time trend assumed for each member's ideological movement means that if the member's ideology shifts dramatically at a certain point in time, then the estimated ideological scores will track this sudden movement with a smooth linear trend over the legislator's entire congressional career. This effect could pose a problem for our tests if we believe that members, in addition to being selected as leaders in large part because of their ideological positions, change their ideological positions *because* they are elected to leadership posts. There may also be problems if the distribution of party members changes over time, as might occur in response to increased ideological polarization (McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2006).

     To address these issues, we replicated each of our tables, instead using W-NOMINATE scores from the Congress previous to the one in which a leadership contest occurred. This modification eliminated the possibility that a legislator's change in voting behavior after assuming a leadership position (a change that might be caused by *becoming* a party leader) would affect our findings. Because we used the W-NOMINATE scores for the Congress previous to the one in which the leadership election took place, the estimates are not based on any votes that occurred after the leader was selected. While distances between members are not directly comparable across time with W-NOMINATE scores, the restriction that the most liberal and conservative members in any given year fall at -1 and 1, respectively, provides some coherence for averaging these distances or absolute distances over time.

     The results of these analyses are substantively similar to the DW-NOMINATE results we have already presented, confirming all of the basic findings. One notable difference is that these new results offer considerably stronger support for the middleperson hypothesis for House Speakers. We can reject the null hypothesis of random selection with $p < .02$. This finding makes sense when we consider the possible biases that could occur from Speakers' (non)voting, which would tend to pull their estimated DW-NOMINATE scores toward the outside ideological wing of their party but which would not be present in their voting patterns in the Congress before their election, as reflected by W-NOMINATE estimates. Selection for the office of Speaker shows

the same centrist tendencies as the overall leadership selection process. The overall results for the candidates-only and candidate averages simulations are also similar in these W-NOMINATE replications.

We performed these same replications, again using W-NOMINATE scores from the previous Congress but then dropping from the simulations the scores of all members who served in the previous Congress but were not reelected to the Congress in which the leadership election took place (and hence did not vote in these leadership contests). The results of these simulations also are quite similar to the original DW-NOMINATE results presented, with the only major difference again being the confirmation of the middleperson hypothesis for the selection of House Speakers from the membership as a whole ($p = .01$). Overall, the robustness of our findings provides confidence in their validity and refutes the possibility that they are driven by our particular choice of ideology measurements.

Discussion

Our findings have important implications for the study of Congress, as well as the nature of representation more broadly. Positively, empirical evidence for the middleperson hypothesis provides support for party cartel models of legislative organization (Cox and McCubbins 1993, 2005). Additionally, these results can guide future theoretical research that requires investigators to make assumptions about the ideological locations of congressional leaders. Normatively, it is heartening to note that leaders—who some political observers argue have strong influence over agenda setting and lawmaking under certain conditions—are, on balance, fairly representative of their parties. If leaders came from the far extremes of the chambers—as suggested by other recent empirical research on leadership selection—then policy might be even less reflective of the preferences of the median voter in the electorate. While we do find support for the directional hypothesis, we note that leaders also tend to be selected from closer to their party's median than would likely occur by chance.

Future scholarship can extend our analyses with closer scrutiny of the conditions under which certain types of leaders are selected. For instance, conditional party government theory (Aldrich and Rohde 1998; Rohde 1991) contends that as parties become more homogenous, they will provide the leadership team with more tools, such as restrictive rules, and potentially select leaders closer to the ideal point of the party median. Investigating the links between leadership ideology, partisan polarization, and rule making will provide authors with fertile areas

for subsequent research. Additionally, researchers can explore whether the dynamics of leadership selection vary according to institutional conditions (such as divided government; see Sinclair 1999) or individual characteristics of members (such as legislative entrepreneurship and effectiveness; Wawro 2001).

Our analyses also reveal that ideology may not be a supremely important variable in explanations of leadership selection per se. Winners are not ideologically distinctive from other announced candidates in contested leadership races. Although some recent work has considered nonideological explanations for intraparty support, it is surprising that much of the extant literature has focused on ideological positioning as a principal variable in the study of leaders. Yet our analysis has shown that the ideological makeup of leaders is mainly determined at the candidate emergence stage. Hence, legislative scholars should not completely abandon the study of leadership ideology, but perhaps they ought to scrutinize the endogenous process by which members decide to vie for elected positions in the first place.

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NOTES

1. Recent volumes of *The Forum* (October 2008) and *PS: Political Science and Politics* (January 2008) have been devoted to congressional leaders, thus highlighting leaders' relevance to both political science scholarship and popular discourse.

Lori Montgomery and Paul Kane, "Sweeping Bailout Bill Unveiled," *Washington Post*, 2 September 2008, A01.

2. Much of the early research on this topic was primarily descriptive and qualitative in nature (e.g., Nelson 1977 and Peabody 1967, 1976).

3. Smith (2007) argued that Nancy Pelosi defeated Steny Hoyer in the 2001 race for Democratic whip because Democrats sought to bring gender balance to their leadership team. Smith quotes Barney Frank: "Everything else being equal, breaking what's been an all-male monopoly of leadership in both houses for both parties is a good thing. That's probably the major difference" (16).

4. Although Truman used the term *middleman,* we use the gender-neutral term *middleperson* throughout this article.

5. All terms related to ideological extremity and centrality in this article are used with reference to the *party*. Hence, a "moderate" or "centrist" lies in the center of their party's ideological distribution, whereas "extremists" are located on the far-left or far-right of the *overall* distribution.

6. Selecting leaders according to ideology is one way that principals can ensure agents carry out the principals' preferences. Enforcement mechanisms, such as selective benefits and elections, can also constrain leader behavior.

7. The concept of a "mode" is somewhat unclear, since members generally have unique ideal points, produced from models assuming a continuous, latent left-right ideological dimension. In the literature on leadership selection, the mode is interpreted as the location with the highest density after researchers have implemented smoothing procedures.

8. Conversely, Cox (1990) has argued that "majority Condorcet procedures," including those used to elect congressional party leaders, select candidates at the median, regardless of the number of candidates.

9. Relatively few leaders have been ousted (according to most definitions), and we found no evidence that the ideologies of ousted leaders are systematically different from those of other leaders. Details are available from the authors upon request.

10. Other researchers have taken the Grofman, Koetzle, and McGann (2002) approach and compared the *entire* committee to the *entire* chamber (e.g., Groseclose 1994). This procedure is more appropriate for testing theories of committee selection, which require the author to compare groups of legislators.

11. We employed two-tailed significance tests computed as the proportion of simulated values that are at least as far from 0 as the observed statistic. Despite the literature's general opinion that leaders are selected from "outside" their party medians, there may also be reason to suspect that legislative bodies select leaders who are ideologically near the chamber, rather than party, medians (e.g., Krehbiel 1998). These two-tailed tests also provide a more stringent standard for rejecting the null hypothesis of random leadership selection.

12. Because of data limitations, we have data from lower-tier races for only the most recent years. Accordingly, we also present results by individual office.

13. DW-NOMINATE scores are unavailable for some leaders and candidates, because those members did not cast enough roll-call votes in a given session of Congress (as is the case for several House Speakers). In these cases, we employed one of two approaches to impute these missing values. If scores were available for each of the two previous Congresses, then our value was two times the score from the previous Congress minus the score from two Congresses before. This method is equivalent to progressing the linear time trend that is assumed for each member's ideal point in the DW-NOMINATE framework from the previous Congress to the current one. If a member's score was missing and only available for the previous Congress (not two sessions of Congress prior), we simply used the score from the previous Congress.

14. We replicated the middleperson and directional tests for all selected leaders using second-dimension DW-NOMINATE scores for the time period in our dataset that this second dimension was salient (the 76th–93d Congresses). These results (presented in the online Appendix at http://webspace.utexas.edu/sjessee/www/research-files/congress-leadership-appendix.pdf) show some support for the middleperson hypothesis in the House but little evidence for the directional hypothesis in either chamber. Overall,

this pattern suggests that although a second ideological dimension may have some influence on leadership selection in some time periods, the primary liberal-conservative dimension plays a far more central role. The middleperson findings may indicate the importance of compromises on race and related issues between conflicting wings of the parties, but this conclusion is somewhat speculative.

15. We could only perform these longitudinal explorations for the Elected Leaders tests presented in Tables 1 and 2, because data for all candidates begin with the 94th Congress.

16. Including or excluding uncontested races does not affect the *p*-values for tests relative to the candidate pool. For uncontested races, in each round of simulations, we simply sampled the single candidate for that race.

17. Variations in the attractiveness of potential leaders' outside opportunities—such as becoming a committee chair or assuming some other position—may also affect these legislators' decisions to run for leadership positions. Unfortunately, the data on candidates for leadership positions begin with the 94th Congress. It is therefore difficult to investigate changes between congressional eras such as the "textbook" (Shepsle 1989) and postreform (Rohde 1991) Congress. Cutting the data at the 100th Congress generally produces similar results. Future research, possibly using different methods, can further explore across-time variation in congressional leadership.

18. This result is somewhat consistent with predictions by McGann, Grofman, and Koetzle (2002; McGann, Koetzle, and Grofman 2002) that winners will be located near the ideological mode of the party, which is generally said to occur on the extreme side of the party's median.

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