Article

Demographic Moderation of Spatial Voting in Presidential Elections

American Politics Research
2020, Vol. 48(6) 750–762

DOI: 10.1177/1532673X20925416
journals.sagepub.com/home/apr
SAGE

Lindsay Dun[1] and Stephen Jessee[1]

Abstract

Using multiple large national surveys, we investigate how the relationship between policy-based ideology and vote choice in presidential elections differs across demographic groups. Specifically, we consider three key demographic characteristics: race, education, and gender. We find that large differences exist in the way ideology relates to presidential vote for voters from different racial groups. By contrast, we find quite small differences in this relationship when separating voters by education level. Perhaps most surprisingly, whereas men are on average more conservative than women, the relationship between ideology and presidential vote is estimated to be almost exactly the same for the two genders. The large sample sizes we employ allow for relatively precise estimation of these relationships even among our various demographic subsamples and these findings hold similarly across several recent presidential elections.

Keywords

voting, ideology, race, education, gender

Recent research has found strong relationships between policy ideology and vote choice in presidential elections. Other work has shown that demographics and other characteristics can moderate the relationship between ideological identification (i.e., ideological self-perceptions) and vote choice. However, these studies have not directly investigated whether different demographic groups vote similarly after controlling for their proximity to candidates in a policy-based ideological space. In this article, we test several hypotheses that are informed by existing literature on how race, gender, and education each relate to policy preferences and vote choice, using an ideology measure that is based on respondents' and candidates' positions on specific, concrete policy proposals rather than on subjective perceptions expressed through ordinal survey rating scales.

We first demonstrate the robust relationship between ideological proximity to candidates in this policy space and voters' choices, using data from several recent American presidential elections. We find, consistent with prior work, that this relationship has an extremely large substantive impact. We then examine several demographic characteristics that literature and theory in political science, as well as popular media narratives, have suggested are politically important, asking whether each of these variables moderates the relationship between policy ideology and vote choice.

Specifically, we estimate the relationship between voters' ideological positions and presidential votes separately for people of each race, education, and gender category. Although we find large differences in this relationship by race, the differences by education are quite small. Perhaps most notably, we estimate little or no difference between men and women in the relationship between policy ideology and vote choice. The large sample sizes of the data sets analyzed allow for precise estimation of these relationships, even among subgroups of respondents. Our findings are relatively consistent across the past four presidential elections, including ones in which gender, race, and education considerations may have been made particularly salient to voters.

Background and Theory

Political science literature has long debated who can be said to be ideological, as well as what it means for ideology or policy views to be "real," dating back to the influential work of Converse (1964) in the American context. For the purposes of this article, we define ideology as a structure of associations underlying the specific policy positions expressed by voters.[1] Exactly where this type of ideology belongs in a causal process of vote choice is the subject of much debate. Authors such as Lenz (2012) and Achen and Bartels (2017) argue that voters are more likely to adopt policy views that are consistent with their established candidate or party preferences than vice versa. These arguments stand in contrast to those of Ansolabehere et al. (2008) and Achen (1975), who

[1]The University of Texas at Austin, USA

Corresponding Author:
Stephen Jessee, Department of Government, The University of Texas at Austin, Austin, TX 78712-1704, USA.
Email: sjessee@utexas.edu

point out that the attitude instability that has been taken as evidence that policy views are not meaningful is also consistent with measurement error.[2] Fowler (2020) argues that much of the evidence presented against policy voting is overstated and that, in the rare instances that partisan and policy-based behavior can be separately identified, policy voting appears more prevalent. Carsey and Layman (2006), using panel data, find evidence that there is reciprocal causation between partisanship and issue positions over time.

Regardless of the causal direction at work here, we argue it is still important to understand how closely voters' choices correspond to their ideological proximity to candidates, and whether this relationship varies among distinct groups. In other words, we do not seek to directly arbitrate between competing narratives about the direction of causality, but instead focus on whether this relationship differs across certain demographic groups. We are also not the first to look at potential moderators of ideology and its application in political behavior, although we are the first to do so using the modeling approach detailed in this article.[3] In particular, unlike previous work looking at demographic moderation of ideological voting, we employ a policy-based ideology measure that is directly tied to specific policy proposals, rather than to subjective understandings of terms like "liberal" or "conservative."

The policy-based definition of ideology that we employ here is closely related to the spatial voting framework. Dating back to Hotelling (1929) and most prominently discussed in political science by Downs (1957), spatial voting theory assumes that the policy views of both voters and candidates can be described by positions in some ideological space. Most often in the context of American politics, this space is assumed to consist of a single liberal-conservative dimension. Each voter is assumed to cast their ballot for the candidate closest to their own position in this ideological space or, in a probabilistic spatial voting framework, voters are assumed to be more likely to cast their vote for a candidate as the ideological distance between their own position and the candidates decreases. This approach presumes that voters have well defined policy views and, at least to some extent, can understand the positions of candidates, including which candidate is most proximate to their own location.

Recent work has leveraged newer survey data along with statistical modeling approaches to obtain policy-based estimates of voter and candidate ideology in a spatial voting framework. Jessee (2009, 2010), for example, finds that in the 2004 and 2008 American presidential elections the relationship on average between voters' ideological proximity to candidates and their choices at the ballot box are similar to the predictions of spatial voting theory, albeit with some error.[4] Evidence for some degree of spatial voting has also been found in American congressional elections (Adams et al., 2017; Shor & Rogowski, 2016).[5] Related work has also considered the role of ideological unpredictability (Rogowski & Tucker, 2018) and candidate moderation (Montagnes & Rogowski, 2015) in spatial voting.

Our contribution is to connect two rich research traditions in political science: one which investigates the importance of certain group characteristics in voters' development of issue positions and voting behavior over time, and one which investigates potential biases in spatial voting. We are the first to test whether group identities known to be important in developing policy ideology and political views more generally produce an additional spatial voting bias in a policy space. By analyzing multiple large survey data sets across multiple presidential elections, we are able to obtain precise estimates of the relationship between policy ideology and vote choice for subgroups of respondents. Furthermore, we are able to examine how these patterns differ, if at all, in electoral contexts that may be said to make those identities salient. Because of our operationalization of candidate proximity, we are able to directly adjudicate between research which shows, on one hand, that the development of issue positions varies systematically between certain groups and research that shows spatial voting can be biased by particular attitudes and identities. In other words, we can clearly "control" for group differences in issue positions, asking to what extent differences in vote choices between these groups result from differing issue positions or differences in voting when holding issue positions constant. Typically, studies of spatial voting and its potential biases rely on ideological self-placement scales. We do not doubt the importance of studying spatial voting with this measure. However, to understand possible group biases in spatial voting, our issue-based measure is critical, as ordinal ideology scales may be understood differently by different groups in American society (Jefferson, 2020), whereas our measures are based directly on respondents' support/oppose positions on concrete policy proposals.[6]

Our analyses below focus on three demographic characteristics that previous literature has argued are particularly relevant for the formation of political beliefs and for making voting decisions: race, education, and gender. We explain below why we believe each of these variables is politically important based on existing literature and theory as well as popular political narratives.[7] While we focus on these three characteristics here, the approach we use could be applied in future research to examine whether other factors moderate the relationship between policy ideology and vote choice in presidential elections.

Race

Race is consistently demonstrated to be one of the most important cleavages in American politics, as it is a critical driver of political socialization and voting behavior. Race has been posited to be an identity that voters may use to update issue positions (Collingwood et al., 2019), and racial identity may also supersede other influences, such as class, in the development and maintenance of political attitudes over time (Dawson, 1994; Tate, 1993). The importance of race in the development of political beliefs suggests

that certain issues may systematically vary in salience and ideological centrality across racial groups. Minority in-group considerations, as well as perceptions of "linked fate,"[8] are most clearly linked to political attitudes among African Americans. The relationship between major political parties and African Americans has also been quite distinctive throughout the history of American politics (see, for example, Frymer, 2010; Gurin et al., 1990; Philpot, 2007), including notable shifts in party sorting (Dawson, 1994). Philpot (2007) argues that "Blacks have developed a unique conceptualization of the liberal-conservative continuum, which has grown out of their unique position in American society" (p. 13). Yet, evidence for both a pan-ethnic identity and linked fate attitudes among Latinos is growing (Segura, 2012). We currently know less about the strength of racial/ethnic identity among Asian Americans, although there is evidence that interethnic commonalities can occasionally produce voting-bloc patterns (Tam, 1995). Perceptions of linked fate and shared identity almost certainly influence what issues are considered most important in the minds of minority voters. If certain racial groups prioritize different sets of policy issues when determining how to vote, we may observe a different relationship between issue-based ideology and vote for members of these groups. This effect may be larger in elections where issues central to the ideologies of racial and ethnic minorities are made salient.

Evidence is also mounting that racial cues might independently influence vote choice beyond standard political predictors. Group-based economic considerations have been shown to impact vote choice and turnout among African Americans, even when controlling for party identity and ideology (Wilson, 2012). Minority voters may be more likely (all else equal) to vote for candidates from the same minority group, producing patterns of racially polarized voting (Abrajano et al., 2005). In addition, Tam (1995) finds that ethnic cues can overwhelm partisan cues among different Asian subgroups, depending on the electoral context.[9] Finally, racial animus has been shown to bias spatial voting among Whites (Algara & Hale, 2019). Although we do not measure or test the spatial biasing effect of this particular attitude, we may observe that Whites as a group are spatially biased in elections where racial animus is brought to the fore. This will certainly depend, of course, on the strength and prevalence of such attitudes in the White electorate. Taken together, these findings suggest that even if all racial subgroups use ideology in the same way, or the relationship between ideology and the vote is the same for all groups, we may observe a directional biasing effect if nonideological considerations pull different groups away from a spatially correct vote choice.

Algara and Hale (2019) make the point that we would expect an additional "race" or "racial attitude" bias when the electoral context renders race particularly salient. The two main elections under study here—2012 and 2016—could be said to meet this condition. In 2012, the first Black president was running for reelection, and in 2016, the Republican candidate repeatedly stoked racial resentment in his public statements, including questioning the legitimacy of Obama's American citizenship.[10]

Education

Education, as well as the related variables of knowledge and sophistication, are often thought to play important roles in political behavior. An individual's level of education has been linked to the decision to turnout (Sondheimer & Green, 2010) and to vote choice (Marshall, 2016). We argue that education might moderate spatial voting, when measured using policy ideology, because those with higher levels of education may be better able to connect issue positions together in a way that mirrors the organizing structure of the liberal-conservative policy spectrum structured by political elites (Converse, 1964). Education is also significantly correlated with intelligence, which affects political sophistication (Luskin, 1990) and has been linked to political interest (Sondheimer & Green, 2010).

There are other variables correlated with education that might play a role in any moderating influence we observe. Research shows that voters whose discussion networks include at least one political expert, for instance, are more likely to make the proximally correct vote choice (Joesten & Stone, 2014). It is likely that the probability of at least one expert in a voter's discussion network increases as one attains higher levels of formal education.

In this article, we consider level of education, rather than political knowledge, because of our demographic focus and also because of the particular role education status was thought to play in the 2016 election. Even before the election, media outlets speculated on the role education level would play in the eventual outcome, and Republican support among low-education voters was credited as a major reason for the Trump victory after the election was over.[11] The education gap in the Trump vote, among Whites in particular, has also been the subject of scholarly inquiry in election post-mortems (Schaffner et al., 2018). This gap is shown to be primarily driven by racism and sexism, and, to a lesser extent, economic considerations (Schaffner et al., 2018). We suggest that, to add to this body of literature, it is important to examine the role education plays as a spatial voting moderator when spatial voting is operationalized through policy positions. This will help us understand whether low-education voters might be more likely to vote for Trump compared not just with higher education voters, but instead compared with higher education voters who hold similar policy ideologies.

Gender

Previous scholarship has documented robust and persistent differences between the partisan affiliations and vote choices

of men and women, which first emerged in the United States several decades ago (Clarke et al., 2005; Shapiro & Mahajan, 1986). Several explanations for these differences have been put forth by scholars, including marriage/divorce (Edlund & Pande, 2002) and feminism or female labor force participation (Inglehart & Norris, 2000). Furthermore, Johns and Shephard (2007) show that evaluations of U.K. MPs on traits such as strength are influenced by gender, particularly among male respondents.

Critically, for our purposes here, another clear driver of the "gender gap" in voting is gender's influence on policy preferences. This influence might mean that gender, in a manner similar to race, could have an effect on the structure of an individual's policy ideology. Gillion et al. (2018) show that women hold systematically different issue positions than men, and that the partisan gender gap emerged when elites more clearly sorted along issues on which men and women differ. Even within the Republican party, women tend to hold more moderate policy positions than men, suggesting again there is a gender-specific effect on individual issue positions (Barnes & Cassese, 2017). Gender also appears to be related to political preference stability and perceived issue importance. Aggregate analyses show that men's policy preferences are more responsive to policy change than women's, making their policy "moods" more variable (Kellstadt et al., 2010). The policy positions most closely linked to ideological identification are often different for men and women, and the ideological importance of issues can change throughout time along gendered lines (Norrander & Wilcox, 2008). This evidence, like that of linked fate or common identity among racial minorities, points to women and men potentially using ideology differently when making a vote decision. This may be particularly true, again, when issues important to one gender group are highlighted in a particular electoral context.

Although there is not a great deal of evidence for a unified "gender identity" that affects vote choice, nonideological gender differences might also mean we observe some directional bias in which women (or men) are pulled away from the spatially correct vote choice, even if the relationship between ideology and vote is the same for both genders. Women are generally more pessimistic about both the state of the overall economy and their own personal finances than men, which can result in an anti-incumbent bias regardless of party identification (PID) or ideological self-placement (Chaney et al., 1998). Theory indicates, then, that the relationship between ideology and vote could be moderated by gender when the state of the economy highlights these gender biases.

Relatedly, sexism has also been shown to influence vote choice, even when controlling for ideology (Schaffner et al., 2018). The role of sexism in vote choice was examined in particular after the 2016 Trump victory. Setzler and Yanus (2018) found that sexism among women helps explain why women voted for Trump. Schaffner et al. (2018) show that sexism helps explain the demonstrated education gap in vote choice among White voters. As is also the case for racial animus among Whites, we do not measure or test a sexism moderation effect in this article. Rather, we offer this as one possible mechanism that could account for any nonideologically driven gender differences we do observe.

The 2016 electoral context makes for a particularly relevant test of a gender moderation effect in spatial voting. It is difficult to imagine an election in which sexism and gender attitudes could be made more salient—Trump called a former Miss Universe winner "Miss Piggy," Megyn Kelly a "bimbo" (among other things), Rosie O'Donnell "fat and ugly," and journalist Maureen Dowd a "neurotic dope." Journalists often speculated that these comments, as well as the *Access Hollywood* tape that was released in October 2016, would be a problem for Trump among female voters. Trump's sexism seemed particularly important because he was facing the first female candidate nominated by a major party in the United States. Thus, in addition to the theory suggesting gender may be an important moderator in 2016, we include one election in our data where gender specific attitudes would have likely been brought to the fore.

Data and Measurement

To learn about the relationship between ideology and vote choice in presidential elections, we use data on specific policy positions for voters and candidates to estimate the ideology of these two groups on the same scale.[12] We find a set of issues and policies on which both a nationally representative sample of voters and each of the two major presidential candidates had taken binary support/oppose positions. We present the results from the 2012 and 2016 presidential elections. In the online supplemental appendix, we also present the results of similar analyses related to the 2008 and 2004 presidential elections, each using slightly different types of survey data.

Our two main data sets are the 2012 and 2016 Cooperative Congressional Election Studies (CCES), which are online surveys fielded to tens of thousands of respondents chosen through a matched random sample methodology and designed to be representative of the American population.[13] These surveys asked respondents to state their positions on a wide variety of policies. Questions included whether respondents supported increasing patrols along the U.S.-Mexico border, whether gay marriage should be legal, and whether the Affordable Care Act should be repealed. More broadly, these surveys included specific policy proposals related to gun control, abortion, immigration, taxes, the environment, and other issue areas. We used data from 18 policy questions in 2012 and from 30 policy questions in 2016, including all available questions in each survey about a specific policy proposal (one that had already been discussed or even voted on in Congress, or in some cases a hypothetical policy) with binary support/oppose answer choices.[14] A full list of these policy items can be found in section 6 of the online supplemental appendix.



Figure 1. Distribution of respondent ideology estimates.
Note. Densities of estimated ideological positions are shown for respondents by party identification (leaners treated as partisans). Candidate positions (fixed at –.25 and .25, respectively, to identify the ideology scale) are noted on horizontal axis. "M" indicates estimated ideological position of median voter.

The positions of the presidential candidates on each of the issues included in the survey were coded based on a combination of online voter guides and popular media accounts (see online supplemental appendix for more details). Although Trump took some issue positions that were different from those held by the majority of his party (notably regarding trade), our coding would indicate that on the vast majority of issues asked about by the CCES he did indeed look like a fairly typical Republican candidate.[15] To estimate the ideological positions of the candidates and each respondent in the 2016 and 2012 CCES, we assume a standard ideal point model, following Clinton et al. (2004) and Martin et al. (2011).[16] The ideology estimates produced can be thought of as a position on a single liberal-conservative spectrum, where lower (higher) values mean more liberal (conservative) policy views overall. Unless otherwise stated, all references to ideology below refer to the estimates generated from this policy-based ideal point modeling approach. The model is identified by fixing the positions of the Democratic and Republican presidential candidates at –.25 and .25, respectively, which allows for the estimation of citizens' ideological positions relative to the candidates.[17] This identification restriction is without loss of generality and is akin to choosing a scale on which temperature is estimated (e.g., 0 and 100, respectively, are the freezing and boiling points for water). Importantly, this decision does not affect the estimated positions of the candidates relative to voters, but merely pins these estimates all down to an interpretable scale. Because they are based solely on support/oppose positions on concrete policy proposals, these estimates can be thought of as measures of policy ideology rather than of ideological identification of the kind measured by ideological self-placement questions. In this way, they are not subject to some of the issues of scale use or of voter attribution of candidate positions discussed by Adams et al. (2005), Feld and Grofman (1991) and others.

Figure 1 plots the distributions of estimated ideology for CCES respondents and presidential candidates in 2012 and 2016. In 2012, we see unsurprisingly that the positions of Democrats, Independents, and Republicans are quite different, with Democrats being almost all to the left of the midpoint between the candidates and the vast majority of Republicans being to the right. Independents have estimated ideologies that are centered near the midpoint between the candidates, but with a good degree of variation.[18] The results for 2016 are quite similar.[19]

The candidates in both elections are estimated to be relatively extreme ideologically, but their locations relative to voters' are estimated with a decent amount of uncertainty.[20] The median respondent is estimated to have an ideology slightly to the left of the midpoint between the candidates' positions.[21]

Demographics and Ideology in Presidential Voting

In this section, we investigate whether the relationship between policy ideology and vote differs across demographic groups. We begin by estimating probit regressions predicting vote choice (1 = *Republican candidate*, 0 = *Democratic candidate*, others dropped) with voters' estimated ideological positions, which are estimated relative to those of the two candidates. Figure 2 shows predicted probabilities of voting for Romney and Trump based on these models. Probit regressions here and below are presented graphically, with numerical coefficient estimates and standard errors corresponding to each model in the online supplemental appendix. Given the huge sample sizes in both our data sets, virtually all coefficient estimates are significantly different from zero and almost all of the subgroup analyses below show significant differences between demographic categories, even when these differences are estimated to be substantively trivial in magnitude. Therefore, we focus our attention on substantive and theoretically important differences in these relationships across demographic groups.



Figure 2. Relationship between ideology and vote choice.
Note. Curve shows predicted probability of voting for Republican candidate in 2012 and 2016 elections from probit regression using respondent ideology.

The magnitude of the relationship in Figure 2 is quite large, with a move from half a standard deviation below to half a standard deviation above the midpoint between the candidates' positions implying an increase of nearly .7 in the probability of voting for Romney in 2012 and an increase of nearly .6 in the probability of voting for Trump in 2016. Notably, one difference between these two election years is how voters who have have their ideology estimated to be in between the two candidates behave. In 2012, voters ideologically equidistant from both candidates have a roughly equal chance of voting for either candidate, but in 2016, this type of voter would be 3 times as likely to vote for Trump as Clinton.

Our next question is whether these relationships differ across subgroups of voters. Specifically, we consider three major demographic classifications that are often discussed as politically important: race, education, and gender, separately estimating the same probit regression model of vote used in the previous section for subgroups of each of these variables. It is worth noting again that virtually all differences described below are statistically significant, even including some differences that are substantively trivial in size. The figures below are based on estimates for the 2012 and 2016 elections, but we present the results of similar analyses related to 2004 and 2008 in the online supplemental appendix. Overall, the patterns identified between these sets of demographic categories are remarkably similar across all of these different presidential contests.

Race

In terms of policy ideology, our analyses reveal strong racial differences across groups, with Whites being roughly a third of a standard deviation more conservative on average than Blacks, Hispanics, and Asians.[22] But how does the relationship between ideology and vote differ across racial groups, if at all? To put it differently, how much of the observed racial differences in vote choice are due to racial differences in policy preferences and how much are driven by differences in vote choice across racial groups when holding ideology constant?

As Figure 3 shows, there are large differences in vote choice by race, even after conditioning on voters' ideological positions relative to the two candidates, with the results being somewhat similar in 2012 and 2016. White voters were the most likely to vote for the Republican candidate and Black voters were the most likely to vote for the Democratic candidate in both elections, holding ideology constant. Hispanic and Asian voters were estimated to fall in between, but were more similar to Whites than to Blacks. A wider gap is also apparent between the estimates for Whites and Blacks in 2016 than in 2012, but given that roughly 90% of Black respondents in both years had estimated ideologies closer to the Democratic candidate than the Republican, it is most relevant to compare predictions for Blacks with ideologies to the left of the midpoint in Figure 3. In this region, the divergence between Black voters in the two election years is much smaller. It should be noted that although the "Other" racial category has been included for completeness, it contains many different (often unusual or even inappropriate) response types. Therefore, it is not clear how estimates for this group should be interpreted.

Overall, it is clear that important, often large, racial differences exist in the relationship between ideology and voting behavior. Voters of different races differ on average not just in their ideological positions or their vote choices, but notable racial differences exist in presidential vote when holding ideology constant.

Education

Figure 4 shows the results of probit regressions predicting presidential vote with ideology, estimated separately by education levels in both 2012 and 2016. Although there



Figure 3. Relationship between ideology and vote choice among racial categories.
Note. Curves show predicted probability of voting for the Republican presidential candidate from probit regression using respondent ideology, estimated separately for each race category.



Figure 4. Relationship between ideology and vote choice among education categories.
Note. Curves show predicted probability of voting for the Republican presidential candidate from probit regression using respondent ideology, estimated separately for each education category.

are statistically significant differences between the various education groups, these differences are substantively small, particularly given the focus on education in popular accounts of the 2016 and even 2012 elections. In 2012, the main difference between groups is that more educated voters show a slightly steeper relationship between ideology and vote. In 2016, the slope of the relationship between ideology and vote does not appear to differ as much by education, but less educated voters were more likely to vote for Trump holding ideology constant (with these differences being largest among liberals). Across both elections, the largest difference in vote probabilities across educational categories (again, holding ideology constant) is only around .1.

Although there were relatively large baseline differences in vote choice by education in 2012 and 2016, these differences mostly vanish when holding ideology constant.[23] The lack of strong differences in the relationship between ideology and vote is notable in both elections, but is particularly so in 2016, when many popular narratives emphasized the importance of less educated voters for Trump's victory. Our results suggest that regardless of their other political attitudes, low-education voters chose the candidate closest to their own policy preferences. As Figure 4 shows, the differences between the voting behavior of more and less educated voters was actually quite small after conditioning on ideological position. These findings are similar when analyzing only White respondents separately by education level (see online supplemental appendix for more details). Although popular narratives about the 2016 campaign often focused on changes in the behavior of the so-called "White working class," which was frequently operationalized as Whites without a college degree, our analyses show that among White respondents the relationship between ideology and vote exhibited similarly small differences across voter education levels in 2016 and 2012.[24] In other words, this relationship was not particularly distinctive in 2016. Our results are



Figure 5. Relationship between ideology and vote choice among men and women.
Note. Curves show predicted probability of voting for the Republican presidential candidate from probit regression using respondent ideology, estimated separately for men and women.

somewhat consistent with those of Weisberg and Nawara (2010) related to education, albeit using a different approach. We cannot assess with these data how low-education and high-education voters are acquiring their policy information, or how they come to hold the policy preferences they do, but we demonstrate that voters at all levels of education show similar relationships between policy positions and vote choice in a spatial voting framework.

Gender

Figure 5 shows the results of separate probit models predicting vote choice for men and women in 2012 and 2016. The relationships between ideology and presidential vote estimated for men (shown with a solid curve) and for women (dashed curve) are nearly identical in both 2012 and 2016.[25] In both elections, the differences between men and women in the probability of voting Republican, although statistically significant, are less than 3% for voters at most ideological positions. The largest estimated difference in either election is roughly 6% for slightly liberal voters in 2012.

The lack of any meaningful gender differences in spatial voting seems particularly surprising in 2016, given that the political environment likely raised the salience of gender issues. Perhaps our overall findings mask the female subgroup thought to drive Trump's success; another popular narrative about 2016 was the role White women played in Trump's election. The online supplemental appendix presents analyses paralleling those in Figure 5 but using only White respondents. The moderating impact of gender appears similar among Whites as among the entire sample, demonstrating that the findings from the full data sets are not masking any particular gender differences among Whites.

Overall, to the extent that gender mattered for voting in 2016, these differences almost completely vanish after conditioning on voters' ideological positions. For example, although women were roughly 10% more likely overall to support Clinton than men, this difference appears due to the fact that women were more liberal on average and, in fact, were 10% more likely than men to have ideological positions estimated closer to Clinton than to Trump. Our results here can be seen as consistent with those of Gillion et al. (2018) who argue that differences between male and female preferences remained fairly stable over time and that the gender gap emerged as a consequence of the two major parties sorting ideologically.

Additional Analyses

In addition to the analyses in the previous sections, which group respondents by a single demographic variable at a time, we also estimate "omnibus" probit models for 2012 and 2016, predicting presidential vote with dummy variables for race, education, and gender categories. These models also include 7-point PID, which is strongly related to vote choice and to many aspects of political behavior more generally (e.g., Campbell et al., 1960). Of course, the relationship between PID and vote choice, and to presidential vote choice in particular, is strong both empirically and conceptually. We could, for example, imagine a voter choosing a candidate because of her PID, but we could also imagine a voter changing her PID because she likes the candidate from a given party. This raises the question of what it means to include PID on the right hand side of a regression predicting vote choice. For example, how should we interpret the relationship between ideology and vote after controlling for PID?[26] Given these concerns, we interpret these results cautiously.

Overall, these models tell a substantively similar story to those presented above and also allow us to easily compare the magnitude of the relationships between various variables and vote choice on the probit scale. We find that ideology has the strongest relationship with vote. A move from the position of the Democratic candidate to that of the Republican candidate corresponds to a shift on the probit scale for vote

choice that is the same as a change of 5.4 points on the PID scale in 2012 and a change of 11.7 points on the PID scale in 2016 (recall that the candidates' positions are fixed at –.25 and .25 to identify the model).[27] The difference on the probit scale for vote probability between male and female respondents with the same ideology is roughly the same as the difference between two respondents of the same gender but with only a very small difference on the ideology scale: .03 in 2012 and .01 in 2016. Although the other demographic covariates are more predictive of vote than gender, the most impactful changes in race and education are equivalent to shifts of only .15 and .02, respectively, in 2012 and .1 and .04, respectively, in 2016.[28] It should be noted that these results from the "omnibus" models are based on the smaller coefficient estimates on ideology that result from including PID in the model. For those who may believe that PID should be left out of these models, perhaps because it may be thought to be largely synonymous with presidential vote, the impact of ideology relative to demographics may be understated here. The online supplemental appendix also includes results for estimating the same models as in the previous three subsections separately for Democrats, Republicans, and independents. Overall, these analyses tell a similar story to the ones above.

In addition to the "omnibus" models, we also ran separate probit models in each election for each demographic interaction group (i.e., Race × Education × Gender), predicting presidential vote with ideology and PID. The results, available in the online supplemental appendix, show strong negative correlations between groups' estimated party and ideology coefficients. But this finding might also be expected if variation in these terms by groups was small, simply due to the fact that PID and ideology are so highly correlated. In particular, this correlation is largely driven by groups with relatively small sample sizes, suggesting that it may simply be the result of sampling error. The most striking pattern in both the 2012 and 2016 plots for these analyses is the much lower coefficient on both ideology and party ID for Black respondents across education and gender categories.

Using Perception-Based Measures of Ideology

The analyses presented above all utilize a policy-based measure of ideology. But it may also be interesting to assess whether the relationship between ideology and presidential vote, including its possible variation by demographic categories, is similar when instead using an ideology measure that is based on perceptions rather than policy. To this end, an analysis presented in the online supplemental appendix replicates the probit analyses using estimates following an approach similar to Hare et al. (2015). These new estimates of ideology are based not on respondent and candidate policy positions, but instead on respondents' perceptions, specifically their 7-point scale ratings of the ideology of themselves and of political actors including presidential candidates.

Overall, the results using these new measures are quite similar to those presented above. The only notable differences are slightly larger discrepancies estimated for Hispanic and other race respondents and Whites, with predictions for these groups falling closer to midway between those for Whites and Blacks. There are also very slightly larger differences estimated by education and also by gender. As discussed in the online supplemental appendix, it is unclear whether these differences reflect real substantive findings or are instead due to the much larger uncertainty in the perceptual ideology estimates as compared with the policy-based ideology used here. It appears that on balance, the findings above apply similarly when using perception-based ideology measures instead of policy-based ones. The relationship between respondents' ideologies and vote choices is similar whether one defines ideology based on specific policy positions or on overall ideological perceptions.

Discussion

We set out to understand whether group identities, revealed in previous work to be important in the development of issue positions and vote choice, altered the relationship between policy ideology and vote choice. Testing hypotheses about demographic moderation of spatial policy voting for race, education, and gender, we find that, whereas race is a potent moderator of the relationship between ideology and presidential vote in recent elections, education and gender exert at most a minimal moderating force.

It is perhaps unsurprising that the strongest moderating effects were observed in racial subgroup analyses. The links between race, attitudes related to race, and vote choice are historically some of the most dramatic relationships in American voting behavior. Previous work has demonstrated that racial identities matter for politics, but our analyses add nuance to these accounts. We are able to show very explicitly that racial group differences in vote are not solely attributable to the difference in average policy positions between groups, but hold even when comparing respondents of different races who have the same ideological position. Mirroring the findings of the separate demographic analyses, race contributes a clear independent (and substantively meaningful) effect on vote choice in omnibus analyses that control for policy ideology and PID. We add to the work of Algara and Hale (2019) by revealing that race (and attitudes correlated with race) can also bias non-White voting groups in a spatial framework, that this finding is robust to the inclusion of several elections, and that observed racial differences are not solely attributable to unique understandings of the "liberal" and "conservative" continuum. To our knowledge, we are the first to present such a robust picture of the potential of race and racial identity to contribute a clear spatial biasing effect. We also show that Whites, as a group, exhibit spatial voting bias. In our data, Whites in particular may often be biased away from the spatially

"correct" vote choice, because they are more likely to have policy ideologies close to the midpoint between the Democratic and the Republican candidate.

Our findings also show that more and less educated voters who hold the same ideologies vote quite similarly. The substantive takeaway from this is that low-education voters who chose Trump in 2016 most often aligned with him on policy. It is possible that these voters simply adopted Trump's positions on issues, though our analysis cannot speak to the extent to which that is true. Regardless, voters' expressed issue positions match those of their candidate choice fairly well across all levels of education. In this way, we supplement the findings of Schaffner et al. (2018), who showed that sexism and racism explain much of the White "education gap" in Trump support. We do not find an additional "low education" spatial bias when controlling for policy ideology, suggesting perhaps that the differences across groups identified by these authors are picked up in policy positions. We hazard this interpretation with caution, as we do not run the same tests as Schaffner, MacWilliams, and Nteta. But, at a minimum, we can say that low-education Whites are not biased away from the candidate closest to them on a left–right policy dimension to a greater degree than other White education groups. Our findings also show that educational differences in the relationship between ideology and vote were similarly small in 2016 and 2012, which might be thought to refute popular accounts about Trump's unique appeal to so-called "White working class," which was often defined as Whites without a college degree. Of course, class and education are not the same thing, and a more careful and complete treatment of class in this type of analysis remains a potentially interesting avenue for future study.

Perhaps, most surprisingly, men and women show only tiny differences in vote probabilities holding ideology constant. This is true even in 2016 when gender-related considerations loomed particularly large. We do not believe that the null effects of gender in our analyses mean that gender never has a meaningful independent effect on vote choice, or that men and women always use ideology to make voting decisions in the same way. It may simply be the case that the gendered context of 2016 did not bias all women (or men) in the same direction. Yet, it is still interesting to note that we observe little unidirectional spatial bias among women as a group in four different presidential elections, and this finding remains similar when we estimate our models separately by PID. This suggests that women, on average, vote differently than men mainly because they hold different issue positions than men. For example, men are "uniformly more conservative than women" (Kaufmann & Petrocik, 1999), women are more supportive of policies that help disadvantaged groups (Hutchings et al., 2004), and women prefer increased social welfare spending (Kaufmann & Petrocik, 1999). Our analysis shows that there is not much evidence of an additional "gender effect" on the vote, given that gender has virtually no relationship with vote conditional on ideology.

Our results, while suggesting a narrower role for some demographic characteristics, can also be read as consistent with the "Columbia School" approach insofar as it emphasizes group consciousness and social networks more than demographics themselves. Our findings of important moderation by race, particularly for African Americans, but small moderation by education or gender, arguably fit this pattern. These findings are robust to alternative operationalizations of ideology, as shown in self-perception scale tests, and the inclusion of alternative elections, as shown in our analyses of 2004 and 2008 in the online supplemental appendix. These robustness checks provide confidence that the demographic moderation findings we see here are not a product of the unique electoral circumstances of 2012 and 2016—elections in which racial and gender considerations may have been particularly salient. It appears unlikely that these results are driven by a particular confluence of events in a single election or by the specific set of questions included in a single survey.

This work reveals that many of the demographic group differences commonly observed in voting behavior can be explained by the policy positions of these groups. In addition, we argue that our results suggest future opportunities for inquiry. It will be useful to assess in future research under what conditions these or other demographic factors might offer additional power predicting vote when controlling for ideology. Other studies might explore changes in these demographic relationships over time or in a comparative context. And, although we examine potential demographic moderators suggested by political science literature to be important, we have not included in our analyses possible attitudinal moderators of spatial voting like religious identity. This further research will be important because a better understanding of when people vote for candidates who are not closest to them on a left–right policy scale helps shed light on voting behavior generally and on electoral contexts and outcomes thought to be particularly unique. While the 2016 presidential election is one example of this type of election, it almost certainly will not be the last.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

ORCID iD

Stephen Jessee https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3937-6123

Supplemental Material

Supplemental material for this article is available online.

Notes

1. There are alternative definitions of ideology—Ellis and Stimson (2012) explore definitional distinctions.
2. See also the work of Mason (2018) who argues that social identities shape both partisanship and views.
3. Federico and Scneider (2007), for example, assess how someone's *need to evaluate* moderates the connection between political expertise and use of higher order concepts in political evaluations. Joesten and Stone (2014) show how alternative decision rules, like presidential approval, often produce voting decisions consistent with a "proximity" rule.
4. See also Adams et al. (2005) for similar arguments relying on ideological rating scales.
5. But see Tausanovitch and Warshaw (2018) for an argument of relatively small effects.
6. Relatedly, Hare et al. (2015) propose a modeling framework based on Aldrich and McKelvey (1977) for estimating partisan differences in scale use. Using a related model but employing anchoring vignettes, Jessee (2020) shows that these partisan discrepancies are mainly driven by perceptual, rather than scale use, differences.
7. See, for example, https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/clinton-couldnt-win-over-white-women/, among many others.
8. "An acute sense of awareness (or recognition) that what happens to the group will also affect the individual member" (Simien, 2005, p. 529).
9. See also recent findings about the effects of ethnic group endorsements (Boudreau et al., 2019) and the role of racial animus in 2016 (Algara & Hale, 2019).
10. https://fortune.com/2016/06/07/donald-trump-racism-quotes/; https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trumps-courtship-of-black-voters-hampered-by-decades-of-race-controversies/2016/07/19/d9822250-4d2e-11e6-aa14-e0c1087f7583_story.html.
11. See, for example, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/oct/16/college-educated-voters-trump-clinton-turnout and https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2018/11/education-gap-explains-american-politics/575113/
12. Our strategy thus stands in contrast to Abramowitz and Saunders (2006) and others, who consider symbolic ideology.
13. For more information about the design and content of the Cooperative Congressional Election Studies (CCES), see https://cces.gov.harvard.edu
14. For example, "What do you think the U.S. Government should do about immigration? Grant Legal Status to all illegal immigrants who have held jobs and paid taxes for at least 3 years, and have not been convicted of any felony crimes" with response options "Yes" or "No." Our data include only one Likert-type question, which was an affirmative action question from 2012 with response options *strongly support*, *somewhat support*, *somewhat oppose*, and *strongly oppose*, making it straightforward to dichotomize. A complete list of questions can be found in the online supplemental appendix. In 2016, we dropped seven items that were asked only of a nonrandom subset of respondents rather than the full sample. Ideology estimates also utilizing these items are nearly identical to ours (see below), being correlated at .997.
15. See online supplemental appendix for all issue position codes.
16. The model is estimated using the MCMCirt1d function from the MCMCpack package in R. The function's default prior specifications were used. All policy parameter estimates can be found in the online supplemental appendix.
17. The ideal point model was run in an unidentified state and the output was post-processed to impose these identifying restrictions. Because the candidates are fixed at –.25 and .25, uncertainty about their ideological positions will propagate into citizen ideal point estimates.
18. Independents here are defined as "pure" independents, with leaners treated as partisans.
19. We do not directly investigate the assumption of a common dimension between voters and candidates here because there are only two candidates analyzed in each election, making the group-based scaling approach essentially meaningless. See Jessee (2016) and Tausanovitch and Lewis (2013) for two largely opposing arguments about the plausibility of these sorts of assumptions.
20. For example, the 95% credible intervals for the proportions of respondents more liberal than Obama and more conservative than Romney are [.02, .40] and [.02, .32], respectively, whereas the 95% credible intervals for the proportions more liberal than Clinton and more conservative than Trump are [.01, .30] and [.00, .10], respectively. The relationships between voter ideology and presidential vote choice, however, are estimated with a high degree of precision, given the very large sample sizes for both surveys. This means that the central results presented below about differences between different types of voters are precisely estimated.
21. Weights provided by the CCES are used when calculating values for survey respondents such as these. The posterior probability that the median respondent is more liberal than this midpoint between the candidates is .85.
22. "Other" race respondents were estimated to be slightly more conservative than Whites on average, but the difference was not statistically significant.
23. These baseline differences estimated from our data sets roughly parallel those estimated from the National Election Pool exit poll Edison Research (2016).
24. Of course, education and class are not the same thing (see, for example, Knapp & Yoon, 2012). A proper treatment of class, which is beyond the scope our our analyses here, would include a larger number of variables and remains a potential topic for future study.
25. In 2016, there are statistically significant differences between both the intercepts and coefficients on ideology for men and women. In 2012, gender differences in the intercepts are statistically significant, but the difference between the coefficient on ideology for men and women is highly insignificant (p = .84) despite the huge sample size.
26. For example, Jessee (2012) shows that as measurement error for ideology estimates decreases, it more strongly predicts vote choice, while the relationship between party identification (PID) and vote choice is attenuated (see also Ansolabehere et al., 2008, for a related point).
27. The maximum shift on the 7-point PID scale is 6 (moving from 1 to 7). This demonstrates that changes on the ideology scale are much more impactful on predicted vote than changes in PID.

28. The most impactful changes on race are from Black to Other in 2012 and from Black to White in 2016. For education, the largest differences in predicted vote probabilities correspond to moving from high school or less to some college in 2012 and from high school or less to graduate in 2016.

References

Abrajano, M. A., Nagler, J., & Alvarez, R. M. (2005). A natural experiment of race-based and issue voting: The 2001 city of Los Angeles elections. *Political Research Quarterly*, *58*(2), 203–218.

Abramowitz, A. I., & Saunders, K. L. (2006). Exploring the bases of partisanship in the American electorate: Social identity vs. ideology. *Political Research Quarterly*, *59*(2), 175–187.

Achen, C. H. (1975). Mass political attitudes and the survey response. *The American Political Science Review*, *69*(4), 1218–1231.

Achen, C. H., & Bartels, L. M. (2017). *Democracy for realists: Why elections do not produce responsive government* (*Vol. 4*). Princeton University Press.

Adams, J. F., Engstrom, E., Joeston, D., Stone, W., Rogowski, J., & Shor, B. (2017). Do moderate voters weigh candidates' ideologies? Voters' decision rules in the 2010 congressional elections. *Political Behavior*, *39*(1), 205–227.

Adams, J. F., Merrill, S., III, & Grofman, B. (2005). *A unified theory of party competition*. Cambridge University Press.

Aldrich, J. H., & McKelvey, R. D. (1977). A method of scaling with applications to the 1968 and 1972 presidential elections. *The American Political Science Review*, *71*(1), 111–130.

Algara, C., & Hale, I. (2019). The distorting effects of racial animus on proximity voting in the 2016 elections. *Electoral Studies*, *58*, 58–69.

Ansolabehere, S., Rodden, J., & Snyder, J. M. (2008). The strength of issues: Using multiple measures to gauge preference stability, ideological constraint, and issue voting. *The American Political Science Review*, *102*, 215–232.

Barnes, T. D., & Cassese, E. C. (2017). American party women: A look at the gender gap within parties. *Political Research Quarterly*, *70*(1), 127–141.

Boudreau, C., Elmendorf, C. S., & MacKenzie, S. A. (2019). Racial or spatial voting? The effects of candidate ethnicity and ethnic group endorsements in local elections. *American Journal of Political Science*, *63*(1), 5–20.

Campbell, A., Converse, W. E., Miller, P. E., & Stokes, D. E. (1960). *The American voter*. University of Chicago Press.

Carsey, T. M., & Layman, G. C. (2006). Changing sides or changing minds? Party identification and policy preferences in the American electorate. *American Journal of Political Science*, *50*, 464–477.

Chaney, C. K., Alvarez, R. M., & Nagler, J. (1998). Explaining the gender gap in U.S. presidential elections, 1980-1992. *Political Research Quarterly*, *51*(2), 311–339.

Clarke, H. D., Stewart, M. C., Ault, M., & Elliott, E. (2005). Men, women and the dynamics of presidential approval. *British Journal of Political Science*, *35*(1), 31–51.

Clinton, J., Jackman, S., & Rivers, D. (2004). The statistical analysis of roll call data. *The American Political Science Review*, *98*(2), 355–370.

Collingwood, L., O'Brien, B. G., & Tafoya, J. R. (2019). Partisan learning or racial learning: Opinion change on sanctuary city policy preferences in CA and TX. *The Journal of Race, Ethnicity, and Politics*, *5*, 1–38.

Converse, P. E. (1964). The nature of belief systems in mass publics. In R. Nieme & H. Weisberg (Eds.), *Ideology and discontent* (pp. 322–357). Free Press.

Dawson, M. C. (1994). *Behind the mule: Race and class in African-American politics*. Princeton University Press.

Downs, A. (1957). *An economic theory of democracy*. HarperCollins.

Edison Research. (2016). 2016 presidential election exit polls. http://www.edisonresearch.com/behind-numbers-2016-national-election-exit-poll/

Edlund, L., & Pande, R. (2002). Why have women become left-wing? The political gender gap and the decline in marriage. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, *117*(3), 917–961.

Ellis, C., & Stimson, J. A. (2012). *Ideology in America*. Cambridge University Press.

Federico, C. M., & Scneider, M. C. (2007). Political expertise and the use of ideology: Moderating effects of evaluative motivation. *The Public Opinion Quarterly*, *71*, 221–252.

Feld, S., & Grofman, B. (1991). Voter loyalty, incumbency advantage, and the benefit of the doubt. *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, *3*, 115–137.

Fowler, A. (2020). Partisan Intoxication or Policy Voting? *Quarterly Journal of Political Science*, *15*(2), 141–179. http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/100.00018027a

Frymer, P. (2010). *Uneasy alliances: Race and party competition in America* (*Vol. 114*). Princeton University Press.

Gillion, D. Q., Ladd, J. M., & Meredith, M. (2018). Party polarization, ideological sorting and the emergence of the US partisan gender gap. *British Journal of Political Science*. Advance online publication. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123418000285

Gurin, P., Hatchett, S., & Jackson, J. S. (1990). *Hope and independence: Blacks' response to electoral and party politics*. Russell Sage Foundation.

Hare, C., Armstrong, D. A., Bakker, R., Carroll, R., & Poole, K. T. (2015). Using Bayesian Aldrich-McKelvey scaling to study citizens' ideological preferences and perceptions. *American Journal of Political Science*, *59*(3), 759–774.

Hotelling, H. (1929). Stability in competition. *The Economic Journal*, *39*, 41–57.

Hutchings, V. L., Valentino, N. A., Philpot, T. S., & White, I. K. (2004). The compassion strategy: Race and the gender gap in campaign 2000. *The Public Opinion Quarterly*, *68*(4), 512–541.

Inglehart, R., & Norris, P. (2000). The developmental theory of the gender gap: Women's and men's voting behavior in global perspective. *International Political Science Review*, *21*(4), 441–463.

Jefferson, H. (2020). *The curious case of Black conservatives: Construct validity and the 7-point liberal-conservative scale* (Working paper). https://ssrn.com/abstract=3602209

Jessee, S. A. (2009). Spatial voting in the 2004 presidential election. *The American Political Science Review*, *103*(1), 59–81.

Jessee, S. A. (2010). Partisan bias, political information and spatial voting in the 2008 presidential election. *The Journal of Politics*, *72*(2), 327–340.

Jessee, S. A. (2012). *Ideology and spatial voting in American elections*. Cambridge University Press.

Jessee, S. A. (2016). (How) can we estimate the ideology of citizens and political elites on the same scale? *American Journal of Political Science*, *60*(4), 1108–1124.

Jessee, S. A. (2020). Estimating individuals' political perceptions while adjusting for differential item functioning. *Political Analysis*. Advance online publication. https://doi.org/10.1017/pan.2019.47

Joesten, D. A., & Stone, W. J. (2014). Reassessing proximity voting: Expertise, party, and choice in congressional elections. *The Journal of Politics*, *76*(3), 740–753.

Johns, R., & Shephard, M. (2007). Gender, candidate image and electoral preference. *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, *9*(3), 434–460.

Kaufmann, K. M., & Petrocik, J. R. (1999). The changing politics of American men: Understanding the sources of the gender gap. *American Journal of Political Science*, *43*, 864–887.

Kellstadt, P. M., Peterson, D. M., & Ramirez, M. D. (2010). The macro politics of a gender gap. *The Public Opinion Quarterly*, *74*, 477–498.

Knapp, M. S., & Yoon, I. (2012). Social class and education. In J. A. Banks (Ed.), *Encyclopedia of diversity in education* (pp. 1968–1973). SAGE.

Lenz, G. S. (2012). *Follow the leader*. University of Chicago Press.

Luskin, R. C. (1990). Explaining political sophistication. *Political Behavior*, *12*(4), 331–361.

Marshall, J. (2016). Education and voting conservative: Evidence from a major schooling reform in Great Britain. *The Journal of Politics*, *78*(2), 382–395.

Martin, A. D., Quinn, K. M., & Park, J. H. (2011). MCMCpack: Markov chain Monte Carlo in R. *Journal of Statistical Software*, *42*(9), 1–21.

Mason, L. (2018). *Uncivil agreement: How politics became our identity*. University of Chicago Press.

Montagnes, B. P., & Rogowski, J. C. (2015). Testing core predictions of spatial models: Platform moderation and challenger success. *Political Science Research and Methods*, *3*(3), 619–640.

Norrander, B., & Wilcox, C. (2008). The gender gap in ideology. *Political Behavior*, *30*(4), 503–523.

Philpot, T. (2007). *Race, republicans, and the return of the party of Lincoln*. University of Michigan Press.

Rogowski, J. C., & Tucker, P. D. (2018). Moderate, extreme, or both? How voters respond to ideologically unpredictable candidates. *Electoral Studies*, *51*, 83–92.

Schaffner, B. F., MacWilliams, M., & Nteta, T. (2018). Understanding White polarization in the 2016 vote for president: The sobering role of racism and sexism. *Political Science Quarterly*, *133*(1), 9–34.

Segura, G. M. (2012). Latino public opinion & realigning the American electorate. *Daedalus*, *141*(4), 98–113.

Setzler, M., & Yanus, A. B. (2018). Why did women vote for Donald Trump? *PS: Political Science and Politics*, *51*(3), 523–527.

Shapiro, R. Y., & Mahajan, H. (1986). Gender differences in policy preferences: A summary of trends from the 1960s to the 1980s. *The Public Opinion Quarterly*, *50*(1), 42–61.

Shor, B., & Rogowski, J. C. (2016). Ideology and the US congressional vote. *Political Science Research and Methods*, *6*, 323–341.

Simien, E. M. (2005). Race, gender, and linked fate. *Journal of Black Studies*, *35*, 529–550.

Sondheimer, R. M., & Green, D. P. (2010). Using experiments to estimate the effects of education on voter turnout. *American Journal of Political Science*, *54*(1), 174–189.

Tam, W. K. (1995). Asians—A monolithic voting bloc? *Political Behavior*, *17*(2), 223–249.

Tate, K. (1993). *From protest to politics: The new Black voters in American elections*. Cambridge University Press.

Tausanovitch, C., & Lewis, J. B. (2013). *Has joint scaling solved the Achen objection to Miller and Stokes*? (Working paper). https://www.vanderbilt.edu/csdi/miller-stokes/05_MillerStokes_LewisTausanovitch.pdf

Tausanovitch, C., & Warshaw, C. (2018). Does the ideological proximity between candidates and voters affect voting in U.S. house elections? *Political Behavior*, *40*(1), 223–245.

Weisberg, H. F., & Nawara, S. P. (2010). How sophistication affected the 2000 presidential vote: Traditional sophistication measures versus conceptualization. *Political Behavior*, *32*(4), 547–565.

Wilson, J. M. (2012). How are we doing? Group-based economic assessments and African American political behavior. *Electoral Studies*, *31*, 550–561.

Author Biographies

Lindsay Dun is a PhD student in the Department of Government at the University of Texas at Austin. Her research focuses on political communication, voting behavior, and content analysis methods.

Stephen Jessee is an associate professor in the Department of Government at the University of Texas at Austin. His research interests include American politics, ideology, voting behavior and public opinion.