Olayinka Agbetuyi
Richard Akinjide and the Political Economy of External Reserves
Chief Richard Akinjide's timely intervention on the best modalities
for a strategic utilization of the proceeds of the increased oil
revenue is one that should engage the attention of the most erudite
minds in the nation, if only because it underlines the fact that the
country is being given a historic economic second chance by the
international forces of demand and supply to put its house in order.
Few nations are this fortunate.
For me, the eminent jurist's analysis is only a rider to another
he gave to Newswatch Communications in the 1990s, that was a scholars
delight. In that piece, Chief Akinjide traced the genealogy of the
Bretton Woods institutions and highlighted the selfish mitivations
which former officials of the bodies like Joseph Stiglitz have since
confirmed.
I will at once agree with the erudite jurist's call for the
maintenance of reserves both in Euros as well as in dollars. It
conforms to the traditional wisdom of not putting one's eggs all in
one basket (of currency). What is more, a sizeable number of
Nigeria's creditors are in the Euro-zone. But I disagree with the
basis of his criticism of the Nigerian government's maintenance of an
external reserve at the level in which it is now held.
I was one of the first to critize President Obasanjo's tour of
Western capitals to solicit investment fundingin 2002, in a
presentation I made in Indiana University (incidentally a few months
later the President came calling at nearby Notre Dame University as
part of that tour).
My logic then allies with the probable guiding principle of the
current reserve policies of the federal governmenrt- investors (local
or foreign) are investment shy in areas where they do not see the
feasibility of returns on investments, no matter the amount of
bowl-begging (investors are not known to be charitable). Herein lies
the public relations of external reserves.
Apart from constituting the reservoir to fund the foreign exhange
demands of nationals, as Chief Akinjide rightly maintained, a
nation's external reserve ratio to debt profile is also an indication
to foreign investors of the country's sound economy and the ability
to pay its bill as and when demanded. This is how it works:
If Nigeria's certified debt profile is $30 billion, foreign
investors are more willing to engage in bilateral and multilateral
projects (inward investments) when they see that the country has a
foreign reserve of $30 billion or more, or that it can pay its way.
(It does not necessarily have to actually pay off that bill).
The matter can be demonstrated further by an analogy of a recent
immigrant to a Western country who has no credit history. He is
asked to deposit funds in a credit account and borrow money against
the deposit. It is the same logic that is applied to international
trade.
Chief Akinjide's model of a local investor sourcing $10,000
presupposes a self-sufficient economy, in which the industrial base
is controlled solely by local entrepreneurs. This is not normally
the model in international economics, and this is counterproductive
to the goal of inward investment. In fact it is this model which led
to the eminent jurist's pessimism regarding the notion of "Nigeria
not becoming substantial non-oil exporter before long." I ask, why
not? The inward investment model is the logic behind the Yoruba
aphorism "A ti owo olowo, ati owo eni, ki oluwa ma fikan won wa" (be
it others resources, be it our own, may we never be lacking in
(investment) resources). A bouyant external reserve is thus an
attraction to the number crunching foreign investor, who taps in with
the flick of a wrist into his computer to assess a nation's credit
worthiness - no one wants to invest in a bankrupt or near-bankrupt
economy. It is against the picture of a rosy external reserve that
the would be investors would be clambering over one another to be the
first to invest in Nigeria (A cordon of armoured tanks encircling
Nigeria will not be sufficient to keep them out -it has happened
before!).
But as the external reserves build up (and this the big but) how
does the average Nigerian keep body and soul together? As the
eminent jurist rightly observes, Nigeria has no state sponsored
welfare system (and I will add, the rich countries are unwilling to
organise a "Marshall" to inaugurate one to cushion the pains of
waiting.) We are now back to "giving SAP a human face."
A middle course which the Obasanjo administration might steer is
to pay off at least one third of the nation's current debt, and split
the remaining two thirds to promoting indigenous enterprises (along
the 1970s indigenisation decree) while maintaining the last third to
accrue further reserves, while the domestic economy is stimulated,
and domestic entrepreneurs source for foreign partners.
Following Chief Akinjide's percentile logic, paying off a chunk of
one third of the national debt will reduce interest payments
substantially, since the larger the debt, the larger the interests to
be paid on it (not minding the deception that the larger the amount
that is owed the lower the comparative interest).
The other alternative that I would suggest has been mentioned by one
of the former officials of these Bretton Woods institution on this
forum earlier this year, who said corruption was not the reason for
Africa's economic woes and counseled unilateral debt repudiation by
African debtor countries if their is no debt forgiveness. I will
discuss the implications, of this solution, if only because Chief
Akinjide mentioned a similar scenario in his 1990s articles but was
jeered by one Father Matthew Kukah in a rejoinder. I will again
discuss the analogy to this option in relation to a Western country
domestic debtor:
Supposing the foreigner in my earlier analogy succeeds in
establishing his credit and maxes out his credit line to say $98,000
out of a possible $100,000.00 credit line and suffer a decline in
personal income from $60,000.00 to $16, 000.00. He is faced with
either declaring bankruptcy (unilateral debt repudiation or debt
structuring and elongation) The latter might involving repaying the
debt virtually throughout his lifetime, without the possibility of
any one granting him further credit until the debt stock is reduced,
and at a prohibitive rate. The earlier would involve the debtor
enjoying a more comfortable life with the new realities of lower
income, because he does not service any debt from it. However
financial institutions will have nothing to do with him for a
stipulated period, (until the bankruptcy is discharged). This is the
implication of debt repudiation by heavily indebted countries, and
this seems to me to be the logic behind Chief Akinjide's 1990s call
for Nigeria to turn to Asia for trading partners, since without
forgiveness, African countries would remain "debt slaves" to creditor
countries for a long time, with the attendant social dislocations and
instability. Debt then becomes a tool of perpetual political
control. But Nigeria's case, following the fortunes of the
international oil market, seems on the road to amelioration from the
other African basket case debtor nations.
Finally, I will briefly touch on another issue mentioned by the
eminent jurist. There seems to be a confusion over the issue of
trading agains the dollar, or pegging a currency against the dollar.
The United States, about two weeks ago, remonstrated with China for
pegging the Chinese currency against the dollar. The protest is
based on the premise that the peg did not allow the seemingly
deliberate policy of te Bush administration to allow the dollar to
slide against the Chinese currency to produce the desired result of
making US exports cheaper to compete with Chinese goods. The Naira
is not known to have been pegged to any currency. Love or hate the
country, the United States currency is one with which any
economically serious nation will have to contend in view of the size
of the US economy relative to the strength and worldwide circulation
of its currency.
To conclude, Chief Akinjide has flagged off an important debate on
how far Western models can go before they bow to local realities and
adaptations. For me, the real test of the success Obasanjo
administration this time around is not how much reserves he is able
to leave behind for the incoming administration, (he did that
commendably in his first outing) but the institution of fool-proof
accounting measures that will survive him and ensure that it is not
all frittered away, as happened in his earlier coming.