Who Are Americans to Think That Freedom Is Theirs to Spread?
By MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, New York Times June 26, 2005
Michael Ignatieff, a contributing writer, is the
Carr professor of human rights at the Kennedy
School of Government at Harvard. He is the editor
of the forthcoming book ''American Exceptionalism
and Human Rights.''
I.
As Thomas Jefferson lay dying at his hilltop
estate, Monticello, in late June 1826, he wrote a
letter telling the citizens of the city of
Washington that he was too ill to join them for
the 50th-anniversary celebrations of the
Declaration of Independence. Wanting his letter
to inspire the gathering, he told them that one
day the experiment he and the founders started
would spread to the whole world. ''To some parts
sooner, to others later, but finally to all,'' he
wrote, the American form of republican
self-government would become every nation's
birthright. Democracy's worldwide triumph was
assured, he went on to say, because ''the
unbounded exercise of reason and freedom of
opinion'' would soon convince all men that they
were born not to be ruled but to rule themselves
in freedom.
It was the last letter he ever wrote. The
slave-owning apostle of liberty, that
incomparable genius and moral scandal, died 10
days later on July 4, 1826, on the same day as
his old friend and fellow founder, John Adams.
It's impossible to untangle the contradictions of
American freedom without thinking about Jefferson
and the spiritual abyss that separates his
pronouncement that ''all men are created equal''
from the reality of the human beings he owned,
slept with and never imagined as fellow citizens.
American freedom aspires to be universal, but it
has always been exceptional because America is
the only modern democratic experiment that began
in slavery. From the Emancipation Proclamation of
1863 to the Civil Rights Act of 1964, it took a
century for the promise of American freedom to
even begin to be kept.
Despite the exceptional character of American
liberty, every American president has proclaimed
America's duty to defend it abroad as the
universal birthright of mankind. John F. Kennedy
echoed Jefferson when, in a speech in 1961, he
said that the spread of freedom abroad was
powered by ''the force of right and reason'';
but, he went on, in a sober and pragmatic vein,
''reason does not always appeal to unreasonable
men.'' The contrast between Kennedy and the
current incumbent of the White House is striking.
Until George W. Bush, no American president --
not even Franklin Roosevelt or Woodrow Wilson --
actually risked his presidency on the premise
that Jefferson might be right. But this gambler
from Texas has bet his place in history on the
proposition, as he stated in a speech in March,
that decades of American presidents' ''excusing
and accommodating tyranny, in the pursuit of
stability'' in the Middle East inflamed the
hatred of the fanatics who piloted the planes
into the twin towers on Sept. 11.
If democracy plants itself in Iraq and spreads
throughout the Middle East, Bush will be
remembered as a plain-speaking visionary. If Iraq
fails, it will be his Vietnam, and nothing else
will matter much about his time in office. For
any president, it must be daunting to know
already that his reputation depends on what
Jefferson once called ''so inscrutable [an]
arrangement of causes and consequences in this
world.''
The consequences are more likely to be positive
if the president begins to show some concern
about the gap between his words and his
administration's performance. For he runs an
administration with the least care for
consistency between what it says and does of any
administration in modern times. The real money
committed to the promotion of democracy in the
Middle East is trifling. The president may have
doubled the National Endowment for Democracy's
budget, but it is still only $80 million a year.
But even if there were more money, there is such
doubt in the Middle East that the president
actually means what he says -- in the wake of 60
years of American presidents cozying up to
tyrants in the region -- that every dollar spent
on democracy in the Middle East runs the risk of
undermining the cause it supports. Actual Arab
democrats recoil from the embrace of American
good intentions. Just ask a community-affairs
officer trying to give American dollars away for
the promotion of democracy in Mosul, in northern
Iraq, how easy it is to get anyone to even take
the money, let alone spend it honestly.
And then there are the prisoners, the hooded man
with the wires hanging from his body, the
universal icon of the gap between the ideals of
American freedom and the sordid -- and criminal
-- realities of American detention and
interrogation practice. The fetid example of
these abuses makes American talk of democracy
sound hollow. It will not be possible to
encourage the rule of law in Egypt if America is
sending Hosni Mubarak shackled prisoners to
torture. It will be impossible to secure
democratic change in Morocco or Afghanistan or
anywhere else if Muslims believe that American
guards desecrated the Koran. The failure to
convict anybody higher than a sergeant for these
crimes leaves many Americans and a lot of the
world wondering whether Jefferson's vision of
America hasn't degenerated into an ideology of
self-congratulation, whose function is no longer
to inspire but to lie.
II.
And yet . . . and yet. . . .
If Jefferson's vision were only an ideology of
self-congratulation, it would never have inspired
Americans to do the hard work of reducing the gap
between dream and reality. Think about the
explosive force of Jefferson's self-evident
truth. First white working men, then women, then
blacks, then the disabled, then gay Americans --
all have used his words to demand that the
withheld promise be delivered to them. Without
Jefferson, no Lincoln, no Emancipation
Proclamation. Without the slave-owning Jefferson,
no Martin Luther King Jr. and the dream of white
and black citizens together reaching the Promised
Land.
Jefferson's words have had the same explosive
force abroad. American men and women in two world
wars died believing that they had fought to save
the freedom of strangers. And they were not
deceived. Bill Clinton saluted the men who died
at Omaha Beach with the words, ''They gave us our
world.'' That seems literally true: a democratic
Germany, an unimaginably prosperous Europe at
peace with itself. The men who died at Iwo Jima
bequeathed their children a democratic Japan and
60 years of stability throughout Asia.
These achievements have left Americans claiming
credit for everything good that has happened
since, especially the fact that there are more
democracies in the world than at any time in
history. Jefferson's vaunting language makes
appropriate historical modesty particularly hard,
yet modesty is called for. Freedom's global
dispersion owes less to America and more to a
contagion of local civic courage, beginning with
the people of Portugal and Spain who threw off
dictatorship in the 1970's, the Eastern Europeans
who threw off Communism in the 90's and the
Georgians, Serbs, Kyrgyz and Ukrainians who have
thrown off post-Soviet autocratic governments
since. The direct American role in these
revolutions was often slight, but American
officials, spies and activists were there, too,
giving a benign green light to regime change from
the streets.
This democratic turn in American foreign policy
has been recent. Latin Americans remember when
the American presence meant backing death squads
and military juntas. Now in the Middle East and
elsewhere, when the crowds wave Lebanese flags in
Beirut and clamor for the Syrians to go, when
Iraqi housewives proudly hold up their purple
fingers on exiting the polling stations, when
Afghans quietly line up to vote in their
villages, when Egyptians chant ''Enough!'' and
demand that Mubarak leave power, few Islamic
democrats believe they owe their free voice to
America. But many know that they have not been
silenced, at least not yet, because the United
States actually seems, for the first time, to be
betting on them and not on the autocrats.
In the cold war, most presidents opted for
stability at the price of liberty when they had
to choose. This president, as his second
Inaugural Address made clear, has soldered
stability and liberty together: ''America's vital
interests and our deepest beliefs are now one.''
As he has said, ''Sixty years of Western nations
excusing and accommodating the lack of freedom in
the Middle East did nothing to make us safe --
because in the long run stability cannot be
purchased at the expense of liberty.''
It is terrorism that has joined together the
freedom of strangers and the national interest of
the United States. But not everyone believes that
democracy in the Middle East will actually make
America safer, even in the medium term. Thomas
Carothers of the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, for one, has questioned the
''facile assumption that a straight line exists
between progress on democratization and the
elimination of the roots of Islamic terrorism.''
In the short term, democratization in Egypt, for
example, might only bring the radical Muslim
Brotherhood to power. Even in the medium term,
becoming a democracy does not immunize a society
from terrorism. Just look at democratic Spain,
menaced by Basque terrorism.
Moreover, proclaiming freedom to be God's plan
for mankind, as the president has done, does not
make it so. There is, as yet, no evidence of a
sweeping tide of freedom and democracy through
the Middle East. Lebanon could pitch from Syrian
occupation into civil strife; Egypt might well
re-elect Mubarak after a fraudulent exercise in
pseudodemocracy; little Jordan hopes nobody will
notice that government remains the family
monopoly of the Hashemite dynasty; Tunisia
remains a good place for tourists but a lousy
place for democrats; democratic hopes are most
alive in Palestine, but here the bullet is still
competing with the ballot box. Over it all hangs
Iraq, poised between democratic transition and
anarchy.
And yet . . . and yet. . . . More than one world
leader has been heard to ask his advisers
recently, ''What if Bush is right?''
III.
Other democratic leaders may suspect Bush is
right, but that doesn't mean they are joining his
crusade. Never have there been more democracies.
Never has America been more alone in spreading
democracy's promise.
The reticence extends even to those nations that
owe their democracy to American force of arms.
Freedom in Germany was an American imperial
imposition, from the cashiering of ex-Nazi
officials and the expunging of anti-Semitic
nonsense from school textbooks to the drafting of
a new federal constitution. Yet Chancellor
Gerhard Schroder can still intone that democracy
cannot be ''forced upon these societies from the
outside.'' This is not the only oddity. As Thomas
Kleine-Brockhoff of the German weekly Die Zeit
points out, the '68-ers now in power in Germany
all spent their radical youth denouncing American
support for tyrannies around the world: ''Across
the Atlantic they shouted: Pinochet! Somoza!
Mubarak! Shah Pahlevi! King Faisal! Now it seems
as though an American president has finally heard
their complaints. . . . But what is coming out of
Germany? . . . Nothing but deafening silence!''
The deafening silence extends beyond Germany.
Like Germany, Canada sat out the war in Iraq. Ask
the Canadians why they aren't joining the
American crusade to spread democracy, and you get
this from their government's recent
foreign-policy review: ''Canadians hold their
values dear, but are not keen to see them imposed
on others. This is not the Canadian way.'' One
reason it is not the Canadian way is that when
American presidents speak of liberty as God's
plan for mankind, even God-fearing Canadians
wonder when God began disclosing his plan to
presidents.
The same discomfort with the American project
extends to the nation that, in the splendid form
of the Marquis de Lafayette, once joined the
American fight for freedom. The French used to
talk about exporting Liberté, Egalité et
Fraternité, but nowadays they don't seem to mind
standing by and watching Iraqi democrats
struggling to keep chaos and anarchy at bay. Even
America's best friend, Tony Blair, is circumspect
about defining the Iraq project as anything more
than managing the chaos. The strategy unit at 10
Downing Street recently conducted a study on how
to prevent future international crises: debt
relief, overseas aid and humanitarian
intervention were all featured, but the promotion
of democracy and freedom barely got a mention.
European political foundations and overseas
development organizations do promote free
elections and rule of law, but they bundle up
these good works in the parlance of
''governance'' rather than in the language of
spreading freedom and democracy. So America
presides over a loose alliance of democracies,
most of whose leaders think that promoting
freedom and democracy is better left to the
zealous imperialists in Washington.
The charge that promoting democracy is
imperialism by another name is baffling to many
Americans. How can it be imperialist to help
people throw off the shackles of tyranny?
It may be that other nations just have longer
memories of their own failed imperial projects.
From Napoleon onward, France sought to export
French political virtues, though not freedom
itself, to its colonies. The British Empire was
sustained by the conceit that the British had a
special talent for government that entitled them
to spread the rule of law to Kipling's ''lesser
breeds.'' In the 20th century, the Soviet Union
advanced missionary claims about the superiority
of Soviet rule, backed by Marxist pseudoscience.
What is exceptional about the Jefferson dream is
that it is the last imperial ideology left
standing in the world, the sole survivor of
national claims to universal significance. All
the others -- the Soviet, the French and the
British -- have been consigned to the ash heap of
history. This may explain why what so many
Americans regard as simply an exercise in good
intentions strikes even their allies as a
delusive piece of hubris.
The problem here is that while no one wants
imperialism to win, no one in his right mind can
want liberty to fail either. If the American
project of encouraging freedom fails, there may
be no one else available with the resourcefulness
and energy, even the self-deception, necessary
for the task. Very few countries can achieve and
maintain freedom without outside help. Big
imperial allies are often necessary to the
establishment of liberty. As the Harvard ethicist
Arthur Applbaum likes to put it, ''All foundings
are forced.'' Just remember how much America
itself needed the assistance of France to free
itself of the British. Who else is available to
sponsor liberty in the Middle East but America?
Certainly the Europeans themselves have not done
a very distinguished job defending freedom close
to home.
During the cold war, while most Western Europeans
tacitly accepted the division of their continent,
American presidents stood up and called for the
walls to come tumbling down. When an anonymous
graffiti artist in Berlin sprayed the wall with a
message -- ''This wall will fall. Beliefs become
reality'' -- it was President Reagan, not a
European politician, who seized on those words
and declared that the wall ''cannot withstand
faith; it cannot withstand truth. The wall cannot
withstand freedom.''
This is why much of the European support for Bush
in Iraq came from the people who had grown up
behind that wall. It wasn't just the promise of
bases and money and strategic partnerships that
tipped Poles, Romanians, Czechs and Hungarians
into sending troops; it was the memory that when
the chips were down, in the dying years of Soviet
tyranny, American presidents were there, and
Western European politicians looked the other way.
It is true that Western Europe has had a
democracy-promotion project of its own since the
wall came down: bringing the fledgling regimes of
Eastern Europe into the brave new world of the
European Union. This very real achievement has
now been delayed by the ''no'' votes in France
and the Netherlands. Sponsoring the promotion of
democracy in the East and preparing an Islamic
giant, Turkey, for a later entry is precisely
what the referendum votes want to stop. So who
will be there to prevent Islamic fundamentalism
or military authoritarianism breaking through in
Turkey now that the Europeans have told the Turks
to remain in the waiting room forever? If
democracy within requires patrons without, the
only patron left is the United States.
IV.
While Americans characteristically oversell and
exaggerate the world's desire to live as they do,
it is actually reasonable to suppose, as
Americans believe, that most human beings, if
given the chance, would like to rule themselves.
It is not imperialistic to believe this. It might
even be condescending to believe anything else.
If Europeans are embarrassed to admit this
universal yearning or to assist it, Americans
have difficulty understanding that there are many
different forms that this yearning can take,
Islamic democracy among them. Democracy may be a
universal value, but democracies differ --
mightily -- on ultimate questions. One reason the
American promotion of democracy conjures up so
little support from other democrats is that
American democracy, once a model to emulate, has
become an exception to avoid.
Consider America's neighbor to the north.
Canadians look south and ask themselves why
access to health care remains a privilege of
income in the United States and not a right of
citizenship. They like hunting and shooting, but
can't understand why anyone would regard a right
to bear arms as a constitutional right. They
can't understand why the American love of limited
government does not extend to a ban on the
government's ultimate power -- capital
punishment. The Canadian government seems poised
to extend full marriage rights to gays.
Some American liberals wistfully wish their own
country were more like Canada, while for American
conservatives, ''Soviet Canuckistan'' -- as Pat
Buchanan calls it -- is the liberal hell they are
seeking to avoid. But if American liberals can't
persuade their own society to be more like other
democracies and American conservatives don't want
to, both of them are acknowledging, the first
with sorrow, the other with joy, that America is
an exception.
This is not how it used to be. From the era of
F.D.R. to the era of John Kennedy, liberal and
progressive foreigners used to look to America
for inspiration. For conservatives like Margaret
Thatcher, Ronald Reagan was a lodestar. The grand
boulevards in foreign capitals were once named
after these large figures of American legend. For
a complex set of reasons, American democracy has
ceased to be the inspiration it was. This is
partly because of the religious turn in American
conservatism, which awakens incomprehension in
the largely secular politics of America's
democratic allies. It is partly because of the
chaos of the contested presidential election in
2000, which left the impression, worldwide, that
closure had been achieved at the expense of
justice. And partly because of the phenomenal
influence of money on American elections.
But the differences between America and its
democratic allies run deeper than that. When
American policy makers occasionally muse out loud
about creating a ''community of democracies'' to
become a kind of alternative to the United
Nations, they forget that America and its
democratic friends continue to disagree about
what fundamental rights a democracy should
protect and the limits to power government should
observe. As Europeans and Canadians head leftward
on issues like gay marriage, capital punishment
and abortion, and as American politics head
rightward, the possibility of America leading in
the promotion of a common core of beliefs recedes
ever further. Hence the paradox of Jefferson's
dream: American liberty as a moral universal
seems less and less recognizable to the very
democracies once inspired by that dream. In the
cold war, America was accepted as the leader of
''the free world.'' The free world -- the West --
has fractured, leaving a fierce and growing
argument about democracy in its place.
V.
The fact that many foreigners do not happen to
buy into the American version of promoting
democracy may not be much of a surprise. What is
significant is how many American liberals don't
share the vision, either.
On this issue, there has been a huge reversal of
roles in American politics. Once upon a time,
liberal Democrats were the custodians of the
Jeffersonian message that American democracy
should be exported to the world, and conservative
Republicans were its realist opponents. Beginning
in the late 1940's, as the political commentator
Peter Beinart has rediscovered, liberals like
Eleanor Roosevelt, Arthur Schlesinger Jr. and
Adlai Stevenson realized that liberals would have
to reinvent themselves. This was partly a matter
of principle -- they detested Soviet tyranny --
and partly a matter of pragmatism. They wanted to
avoid being tarred as fellow travelers, the fate
that had met Franklin Roosevelt's former running
mate, the radical reformer Henry Wallace. The
liberals who founded Americans for Democratic
Action refounded liberalism as an anti-Communist
internationalism, dedicated to defending freedom
and democracy abroad from Communist threat. The
missionary Jeffersonianism in this reinvention
worried many people -- for example, George
Kennan, the diplomat and foreign-policy analyst
who argued that containment of the Communist
menace was all that prudent politics could
accomplish.
The leading Republicans of the 1950's -- Robert
Taft, for example -- were isolationist realists,
doubtful that America should impose its way on
the world. Eisenhower, that wise old veteran of
European carnage, was in that vein, too: prudent,
risk-avoiding, letting the Soviets walk into
Hungary because he thought war was simply out of
the question, too horrible to contemplate. In the
1960's and 70's, Richard Nixon and Henry
Kissinger remained in the realist mode. Since
stability mattered more to them than freedom,
they propped up the shah of Iran, despite his
odious secret police, and helped to depose
Salvador Allende in Chile. Kissinger's guiding
star was not Jefferson but Bismarck. Kissinger
contended that people who wanted freedom and
democracy in Eastern Europe were lamentable
sentimentalists, unable to look at the map and
accommodate themselves to the eternal reality of
Soviet power.
It was Reagan who began the realignment of
American politics, making the Republicans into
internationalist Jeffersonians with his speech in
London at the Palace of Westminster in 1982,
which led to the creation of the National
Endowment for Democracy and the emergence of
democracy promotion as a central goal of United
States foreign policy. At the time, many
conservative realists argued for detente, risk
avoidance and placation of the Soviet bear. Faced
with the Republican embrace of Jeffersonian
ambitions for America abroad, liberals chose
retreat or scorn. Bill Clinton -- who took
reluctant risks to defend freedom in Bosnia and
Kosovo -- partly arrested this retreat, yet since
his administration, the withdrawal of American
liberalism from the defense and promotion of
freedom overseas has been startling. The Michael
Moore-style left conquered the Democratic Party's
heart; now the view was that America's only
guiding interest overseas was furthering the
interests of Halliburton and Exxon. The
relentless emphasis on the hidden role of oil
makes the promotion of democracy seem like a
devious cover or lame excuse. The unseen cost of
this pseudo-Marxist realism is that it
disconnected the Democratic Party from the
patriotic idealism of the very electorate it
sought to persuade.
John Kerry's presidential campaign could not
overcome liberal America's fatal incapacity to
connect to the common faith of the American
electorate in the Jeffersonian ideal. Instead he
ran as the prudent, risk-avoiding realist in 2004
-- despite, or perhaps because of, the fact that
he had fought in Vietnam. Kerry's caution was
bred in the Mekong. The danger and death he
encountered gave him some good reasons to prefer
realism to idealism, and risk avoidance to
hubris. Faced with a rival who proclaimed that
freedom was not just America's gift to mankind
but God's gift to the world, it was
understandable that Kerry would seek to emphasize
how complex reality was, how resistant to
American purposes it might be and how high the
price of American dreams could prove. As it
turned out, the American electorate seemed to
know only too well how high the price was in
Iraq, and it still chose the gambler over the
realist. In 2004, the Jefferson dream won
decisively over American prudence.
But this is more than just a difference between
risk taking and prudence. It is also a
disagreement about whether American values
properly deserve to be called universal at all.
The contemporary liberal attitude toward the
promotion of democratic freedom -- we like what
we have, but we have no right to promote it to
others -- sounds to many conservative Americans
like complacent and timorous relativism, timorous
because it won't lift a finger to help those who
want an escape from tyranny, relativist because
it seems to have abandoned the idea that all
people do want to be free. Judging from the
results of the election in 2004, a majority of
Americans do not want to be told that Jefferson
was wrong.
VI.
A relativist America is properly inconceivable.
Leave relativism, complexity and realism to other
nations. America is the last nation left whose
citizens don't laugh out loud when their leader
asks God to bless the country and further its
mighty work of freedom. It is the last country
with a mission, a mandate and a dream, as old as
its founders.
All of this may be dangerous, even delusional,
but it is also unavoidable. It is impossible to
think of America without these properties of
self-belief.
Of course, American self-belief is not an eternal
quantity. Jefferson airily assumed that democracy
would be carried on the wings of enlightenment,
reason and science. No one argues that now. Not
even Bush. He does speak of liberty as ''the plan
of heaven for humanity and the best hope for
progress here on Earth,'' but in more sober
moments, he will concede that the promotion of
freedom is hard work, stretching out for
generations and with no certain end in sight.
The activists, experts and bureaucrats who do the
work of promoting democracy talk sometimes as if
democracy were just a piece of technology, like a
water pump, that needs only the right
installation to work in foreign climes. Others
suggest that the promotion of democracy requires
anthropological sensitivity, a deep understanding
of the infinitely complex board game of foreign
(in this case Iraqi) politics.
But Iraqi freedom also depends on something whose
measurement is equally complex: what price, in
soldiers' bodies and lives, the American people
are prepared to pay. The members of the American
public are ceaselessly told that stabilizing Iraq
will make them more secure. They are told that
fighting the terrorists there is better than
fighting them at home. They are told that victory
in Iraq will spread democracy and stability in
the arc from Algeria to Afghanistan. They are
told that when this happens, ''they'' won't hate
Americans, or hate them as much as they do now.
It's hard to know what the American people
believe about these claims, but one vital test of
whether the claims are believed is the number of
adolescent men and women prepared to show up at
the recruiting posts in the suburban shopping
malls and how many already in the service or
Guard choose to re-enlist and sign up for another
tour in Ramadi or Falluja. The current word is
that recruitment is down, and this is a serious
sign that someone at least thinks America is
paying too high a price for its ideals.
Of all human activities, fighting for your
country is the one that requires most elaborate
justification. Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. once
said that ''to fight out a war, you must believe
something and want something with all your
might.'' He had survived Antietam and the
annihilating horror of the Battle of the
Wilderness, so he knew of what he spoke. The test
that Jefferson's dream has to pass is whether it
gives members of a new generation something they
want to fight for with all their might.
Two years from now is the earliest any senior
United States commander says that Americans can
begin to come home from Iraq in any significant
numbers. Already the steady drip of casualties is
the faintly heard, offstage noise of contemporary
American politics. As this noise grows louder, it
may soon drown out everything else. Flag-draped
caskets are slid down the ramps of cargo planes
at Dover Air Force Base and readied for their
last ride home to the graveyards of America. In
some region of every American's mind, those
caskets raise a simple question: Is Iraqi freedom
worth this?
It would be a noble thing if one day 26 million
Iraqis could live their lives without fear in a
country of their own. But it would also have been
a noble dream if the South Vietnamese had been
able to resist the armored divisions of North
Vietnam and to maintain such freedom as they had.
Lyndon Johnson said the reason Americans were
there was the ''principle for which our ancestors
fought in the valleys of Pennsylvania,'' the
right of people to choose their own path to
change. Noble dream or not, the price turned out
to be just too high.
There is nothing worse than believing your son or
daughter, brother or sister, father or mother
died in vain. Even those who have opposed the
Iraq war all along, who believe that the hope of
planting democracy has lured America into a
criminal folly, do not want to tell those who
have died that they have given their lives for
nothing. This is where Jefferson's dream must
work. Its ultimate task in American life is to
redeem loss, to rescue sacrifice from oblivion
and futility and to give it shining purpose. The
real truth about Iraq is that we just don't know
-- yet -- whether the dream will do its work this
time. This is the somber question that hangs
unanswered as Americans approach this Fourth of
July.