In writing this section I had primarily in view the doctrine set forth in Mr. Spencer's Social Statics. As Mr. Spencer has restated his view and replied to my arguments in his Data of Ethics, it is necessary for me to point out that the first paragraph of this section is not directed against such a view of `Absolute' and `Relative' Ethics as is given in the later treatise---which seerus to me to differ materially from the doctrine of Social Statics. in Social Statics it is maintained not merely---as in the Data of Ethics---that Absolute Ethics which ``formulates normal conduct in an ideal society'' ought to ``take precedence of Relative Ethics''; but that Absolute Ethics is the only kind of Ethics with which a philosophical moralist can possibly concern himself. To quote Mr. Spencer's words:---``Any proposed system of morals which recognises existing defects, and countenances acts made needful by them, stands self-condemned … Moral law … requires as its postulate that human beings be perfect. The philosophical moralist treats solely of the straight man … shows in what relationship he stands to other straight men … a problem in which a crooked man forms one of the elements, is insoluble by him.'' Social Statics (chap. i.). Still more definitely is Relative Ethics excluded in the following passage of the concluding chapter of the same treatise (the italics are mine):---``It will very likely be urged that, whereas the perfect moral code is confessedly beyond the fulfilment of imperfect men, some other code is needful for our present guidance … to say that the imperfect man requires a moral code which recognises his imperfection and allows for it, seems at first sight reasonable. But it is not really so … a system of morals which shall recognise man's present imperfections and allow for them cannot be devised; and would be useless if it could be devised.''