It is, however, necessary to distinguish between the ideas of Moral Goodness and Beauty as applied to human actions: although there is much affinity between them, and they have frequently been identified, especially by the Greek thinkers. No doubt both the ideas themselves and tile corresponding pleasurable emotions, arising on the contemplation of conduct, are often indistinguishable: a noble action affects us like a scene, a picture, or a strain of music: and the delineation of human virtue is all important part of the means which the artist has at his disposal for producin., his peculiar effects. Still, on looking closer, we see not only that there is much good conduct which is not beautiful, or at least does not sensibly impress us as such; but even that certain kinds of crime and wickedness have a splendour and sublimity of their own. For example, such a career as Caesar Borgia's, as Renan says, is ``beau comme une tempête, comme un abîme''. It is true, I think, that in all such cases the beauty depends upon the exhibition in the criminal's conduct of striking gifts and excellences mingled with the wickedness: but, it does not seem that we can abstract the latter without impairing the aesthetic effect. And hence I conceive, we have to distinguish the sense of beauty in conduct from the sense of moral goodness.