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# Sea Rovers, Silver, and Samurai

**Maritime East Asia in Global History,  
1550–1700**

Edited by Tonio Andrade and Xing Hang



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35. Most of the people in Taiwan, however, do accept the term "Taiwan Republic," a short-lived state created by the Qing Mandarins in Taiwan after the first Sino-Japanese War of 1894–95.

36. On the other hand, the PRC would highlight the role of Koxinga as an individual who successfully expelled the Dutch out of the "motherland."

37. Chen Chi-nan (Chen Qinan, b. 1947), the Yale-trained anthropologist and also former minister of the Council for Cultural Affairs, Executive Yuan, from 2004 to 2006, in his newspaper article dated August 21, 2011, even quoted a statement by an early twentieth-century Japanese scholar, Kojima Yoshimichi, and perceives the image of the political organization of Paiwan tribes as a federation similar to the prototype of the early nineteenth/twentieth German empire. See <http://www.libertytimes.com.tw/2011/new/aug/21/today-o1.htm>.

38. Yu Insun, "Lê Văn Hưu and Ngô Sĩ Liên: A Comparison of Their Perception of Vietnamese History," in *Việt Nam: Borderless Histories*, ed. Nhung Tuyet Tran and Anthony Reid (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2006), 45–71.

39. Edward Chen I-te, "Japanese Colonialism in Korean and Formosa: A Comparison of Its Effects upon the Development of Nationalism" (PhD diss., University of Pennsylvania, 1968), 61–62.

## Japan in the Chinese Tribute System

Mark Ravina

The Tokugawa shogunate occupied an ambiguous position in the Ming/Qing tributary system. On the one hand, the Tokugawa were eager to distinguish themselves from Toyotomi Hideyoshi's disastrous foreign adventurism of the 1590s, which laid waste to Korea but ended in his defeat. Viewed from Seoul and Beijing, the Tokugawa were successors to a dangerous megalomaniac, and the early Tokugawa shoguns wanted to dissociate themselves from this legacy. On the other hand, like Hideyoshi, the Tokugawa were unwilling to recognize Chinese supremacy. Unlike the Yi monarchs of Korea or the Ashikaga shoguns, the Tokugawa shoguns refused to accept direct investiture from a Chinese monarch. This meant that the Tokugawa could not have direct state-to-state relations with either the Ming or the Qing.

The result of these tensions was a distinct local variant of the Chinese tributary system. For over two centuries, from 1609 until 1874, Japan managed to trade peacefully with its three major neighbors: Ming/Qing China, Yi Korea, and Shō Ryukyu. Maintaining these relations required a sustained policy of obfuscation. Because the Tokugawa would not participate in the Chinese tributary system, trade and diplomatic relations needed to be described in an alternative register. The Tokugawa regime thus produced new terms and diplomatic protocols that could link Japan, China, Korea, and Ryukyu while evading the question of Ming/Qing hegemony. Some of these neologisms are well known, if indirectly. For example, the English term "tycoon" comes from the Japanese *taikun* (great lord). This term was created so that Korean diplomats could address the shogun without using the word "king." That phrase might have suggested that the "king" of Japan was subordinate to the Chinese emperor.

In his pathbreaking research, Arano Yasunori famously termed these diplomatic arrangements a "Japanese-style international order" (*Nihon-gata ka'i chitsujo*). Arano argued that the goal of Tokugawa foreign policy was

not national isolation (*sakoku*) but the establishment of Tokugawa legitimacy domestically. The Tokugawa were not averse to international relations—only to situations that might damage their aura of supremacy.<sup>1</sup>

While building on Arano's insights, I emphasize the mutuality of early modern East Asian diplomacy. Tokugawa rhetoric in Edo did not necessarily carry the same weight in Busan or Seoul. On the contrary, the two states kept the peace because they ignored each other's pretensions. These strategies of willful ignorance constituted a distinct Northeast Asian interstate system. While the Chinese tribute system was based on a unitary and explicit hierarchy, the Northeast Asian interstate system balanced multiple contradictory hierarchies. By allowing for contradictory rituals of obeisance, Northeast Asia overcame the legacy of Hideyoshi's invasion and sustained over two centuries of peace.<sup>2</sup>

### TOKUGAWA JAPAN AND YI KOREA

A cornerstone of Tokugawa policy was peace with the Yi dynasty. Tokugawa Ieyasu disavowed Hideyoshi's invasion to a Korean representative in 1605, insisting that he had not fought in the campaign.<sup>3</sup> This was narrowly true but broadly false; although Ieyasu had stayed in Japan, his duty had been to provide logistical support for Hideyoshi. But the Korean court was surprisingly amenable to Tokugawa overtures and reopened diplomatic relations with Japan in 1607. Korea sent three preliminary missions to Japan in 1607, 1617, and 1624 before sending a formal embassy in 1636.<sup>4</sup> Over the next two centuries, seven additional missions visited Edo, usually to celebrate and recognize the succession of a new shogun. These embassies were routed for maximum public impact, and the visits were choreographed to enhance Tokugawa prestige. Rather than have the delegation arrive at Edo, the diplomats were paraded overland from Kyoto to Edo, through the most densely populated region of Japan, ensuring the largest possible audience. Enormous crowds turned out for the spectacle: a procession of hundreds of elegantly dressed guests of state. When the diplomats visited Edo castle, all daimyo were ordered to be present for the official reception. Three embassies (1636, 1643, and 1655) continued on from Edo castle to Tokugawa Ieyasu's mausoleum at Nikkō, presenting gifts to the founder of Tokugawa hegemony and thereby conferring legitimacy on the shogunate.<sup>5</sup>

Japanese rituals of subordination in Pusan balanced these gestures. The Tokugawa did not send an ambassador to the Yi court but were represented by an intermediary, the daimyo of Tsushima. Chosŏn officials considered Tsushima to be their own quasi-tributary state. Chosŏn had conquered Tsushima in 1419 (J. *Ōei no gaikō* / K. *Kihae Tongjŏng*) in order to

suppress *wakō* piracy, and the Korean court only allowed trade with Tsushima after the daimyo promised to suppress the pirates. Accordingly, some Korean statesmen argued explicitly that "the lord of Tsushima was as much a vassal of our own country as of Japan."<sup>6</sup> Tsushima officials continued to offer ritual deference to Chosŏn throughout the Tokugawa era, particularly when repatriating Korean castaways. Repatriation ceremonies were formalized in the 1640s and involved elaborate rituals of munificence and obeisance, including sending a special repatriation envoy on a designated ship. The envoy was allowed to stay at the Japanese compound in Pusan for up to fifty-five days, during which time he was entertained with lavish banquets and showered with gifts. In return for Chosŏn's generosity, the envoy showed his gratitude at a "bowing ceremony" and a "tribute ceremony," bowing before a wooden plaque representing the Yi monarch.<sup>7</sup>

Officials in Seoul, Tsushima, and Edo thus held different views of their mutual relationships, and their diplomatic practices allowed for ambiguity, contradiction, deception, and even outright fraud. The 1609 compact normalizing Japanese-Korean relations, for example, was based on forged documents. The daimyo of Tsushima, Sō Yoshitoshi (1568–1615), was eager to mend relations between Edo and Seoul since his island domain heavily depended on trade. Faced with deadlock over a matter of protocol, Yoshitoshi's representatives "fixed" the problem by fabricating a letter from Tokugawa Ieyasu to King Sŏnjo (b. 1552, r. 1567–1608). The letter referred to Ieyasu as the "King of Japan" and was dated according to the Ming calendar. Korean officials were immediately suspicious; the combination of the Chinese calendar system and title "king" implied that the Japanese shogun saw himself as a vassal of the Ming emperor, and they were aware that these were precisely the concessions Ieyasu was unwilling to make. But Yi diplomats accepted the letter nonetheless. The shogunate itself seems to have known of the forgery and chose to ignore it, using the opening to conclude a treaty. The shogunate took action only in 1635, when the forgery was exposed due to factional infighting within Tsushima. But the shogun's response was surprisingly lenient. Forging a letter from the shogun was severe enough to warrant the seizure of Sō holdings and extirpation of their lineage, but the shogun ordered nothing so severe. The forgers themselves were executed, and two high-ranking officials were punished, but the Sō house itself escaped with a reprimand. More remarkably, the shogunate saw no reason to change the 1609 agreement, and the Sō were kept in place as intermediaries in Japanese-Korean diplomatic relations. On the vexing questions of calendars and titles, the Yi and the Tokugawa regimes developed a compromise. They used the zodiac system as a neutral calendar and used the term "great lord" (*taikun*) to refer to the shogun. *Taikun* (*taejŏn* in Korean)

sounded regal in both Japanese and Korean but had never been used in diplomatic correspondence. It was thus unclear whether a *taikun* was superior or inferior to a king and how such a noble related to the Ming, Qing, and Japanese emperors.<sup>8</sup> This was an effective means of resolving conflict between the Yi and the Tokugawa; either side could imagine itself as superior.<sup>9</sup>

Mutual self-interest drove Tokugawa diplomatic exchanges with Korea. The Yi dynasty maintained relations with the Tokugawa in part to counterbalance the threat of the Manchus and, later, the Qing dynasty. In 1616, the Manchus declared war on the Ming and thereafter steadily gained control over Northeast Asia, forcing King Injo (b. 1595, r. 1623–1649) to become their vassal king in 1637. In 1644, Manchu forces moved south of the Great Wall and seized Beijing. The victory of the Qing over the Ming transformed the cultural dynamics of Northeast Asia; the ruling dynasty of China was no longer Chinese.

The impact of the change was particularly profound in Korea, where it was perceived as tantamount to the disintegration of civilization.<sup>10</sup> Early modern Korea was a deeply Confucian society, and the Yi dynasty claimed legitimacy in part through its investiture by the Ming. So thoroughly did the Yi court conform to Chinese notions of international relations that Ming texts cited Korea as a model tributary state.<sup>11</sup> Under the Qing, the Korean intelligentsia began to describe itself as the last bastion of civilization; the Ming might have fallen, but Korea would sustain the virtues of Confucian culture. Ming loyalism became an important part of Korean elite cultural identity, exemplified by the Yi dynasty's building of a shrine to the Ming and the use of "Revere the Ming, resist the Qing" as a favored couplet. This fear and loathing of the Qing had a paradoxical impact on Yi-Tokugawa relations. Seen from Seoul, the Japanese were barbarian invaders. But compared to the Manchus, the Japanese were a less offensive type of barbarian and, unlike the Qing, the Tokugawa had disavowed a desire to subjugate Korea.<sup>12</sup> The Yi dynasty thus tolerated renewed relations with Japan, including diplomatic innovations such as the title *taikun*.

#### TOKUGAWA JAPAN AND SHŌ RYUKYU

While rejecting Hideyoshi's vision of empire, Ieyasu was willing to support more limited military actions. As a warrior house, the Tokugawa were not averse to combat—only to conflicts that might damage their aura of supremacy. Thus, Ieyasu backed the daimyo of Satsuma in 1609 when he invaded and conquered the Shō dynasty-led kingdom of Ryukyu (today's

Okinawa Prefecture). That contest produced a quick and clear victory, and the Ryukyu king became a vassal of both the Tokugawa shoguns and the Shimazu, the daimyo house of Satsuma. The Ryukyu campaign followed the logic that Japanese foreign relations should unerringly enhance Tokugawa legitimacy. In his surrender of 1609, King Shō Nei (b. 1564, r. 1587–1620) pledged that he and his people would "forever be the humble servants of Satsuma and obedient to all commands, and never will be traitors to our Lord."<sup>13</sup> Because the daimyo of Satsuma had sworn fealty to the Tokugawa, the Shō kings were now vassals of the Tokugawa as well. Accordingly, representatives of the Shō dynasty travelled to Edo to receive confirmation for new Shō kings, as well as to celebrate the succession of new shoguns.<sup>14</sup> These embassies were less grand but more frequent than Korean embassies and were similarly important as a public show of legitimacy; the legations were instructed to dress in Ryukyuan garb in order to emphasize their "foreignness."<sup>15</sup>

The Shō kings of Ryukyu had less flexibility in their relations with Japan than Yi monarchs, but Tokugawa-Shimazu-Shō relations also involved diplomatic protocols that, by modern European standards, amounted to evasion and deceit. The Shimazu had conquered Ryukyu, but they wanted to maintain the appearance of Ryukyuan autonomy. Ryukyu was most valuable as an entrepôt for trade with China, and the Ming (and later the Qing) allowed limited trade with Ryukyu as part of Shō diplomatic missions. Ryukyuan officials were also a valuable source of information about China, since their envoys met with high-ranking government officials in Beijing. But China allowed regular missions only because they saw the Shō as loyal vassal kings of Beijing. Had the Shimazu bragged about their conquest, the Ming would have cut ties with Ryukyu. The Shimazu thus described Ryukyu in two contradictory manners. Within Japan, they celebrated their victory, claiming that their conquest of Ryukyu gave them unique status among the daimyo. Internationally, however, the Shimazu tried to hide evidence of their conquest and developed increasingly specific protocols for masking their influence. By the eighteenth century, for example, it was official policy that Japanese officials should leave Naha, the capital of Ryukyu, and hide in a nearby village when Chinese embassies were visiting. By the mid-eighteenth century, these ruses had developed into a formal system of disinformation, complete with protocols and handbooks. The Japanese conquest of Ryukyu was thus strikingly different from Hideyoshi's invasion of Korea. Hideyoshi aspired to defeat the Ming and lost. By contrast, the Tokugawa conquered a Ming vassal-state but endeavored not to offend the Ming and interrupt trade.<sup>16</sup> These strategies worked because Chinese officials

chose to ignore evidence of the Japanese presence in Ryukyu, such as men with Japanese hairstyles and a temple bell dated according to the Japanese calendar.<sup>17</sup> The Chinese court was willing to tolerate Japanese influence in Ryukyu, so long as the dignity of the Chinese embassy was respected.<sup>18</sup>

One of the strangest aspects of Chinese-Japanese-Ryukyuan relations was the creation of an imaginary country, Tokara, known in English as Tucharu or Tsuchara. In order to sustain the conceit that Ryukyu was not under Japanese control, Satsuma concealed its control over the Amami and Tokara Islands. They referred to the Amami archipelago as the Michinoshima Islands and pretended that it was Ryukyuan territory.<sup>19</sup> The island of Tokara itself (also known as Takarashima) was described, variously, as Japanese, Ryukyuan, or as a semiautonomous entity. The creation of this imaginary buffer territory helped explain Japanese influence over Ryukyu. If Chinese diplomats discovered Japanese-looking people or objects, the protocol was to describe these as coming from Tokara. This invented country was said to maintain ties with both Japan and Ryukyu. People from Tokara could therefore look and sound Japanese even though Ryukyu itself did not (according to this ruse) have direct contact with Japan. So compelling was this fantasy that it was reproduced in official Ryukyuan histories.<sup>20</sup>

Because these arrangements willfully muddled questions of sovereignty, Ryukyuan could not explain themselves to Westerners and instead feigned ignorance of East Asian geography. Thus, the English explorer Beechey reported that the Ryukyuan "show so much anxiety for charts" but "their knowledge of geography is indeed, extremely limited." In point of fact, the Ryukyuan were not ignorant but were struggling to maintain Tokugawa-Shō-Qing diplomacy by juggling and muddling their accounts of the Amami archipelago.<sup>21</sup> Westerners were indeed confused and were eventually surprised to discover that Tokara/Tucharu was a tiny island rather than a substantial country. As late as 1853, George Smith, a British missionary, took reports of the land of Tucharu at face value. He dutifully reported Ryukyuan assertions that the people of Tucharu, "although belonging to Japanese territory, yet being situated nearer to us, are permitted to trade with this place."<sup>22</sup> Eight years later, he reported that Tucharu was, in fact, a conceit: "The Loochooan [Ryukyuan] authorities were never allowed to mention the name of Satsuma or Japan. Tucharu is the locality with which alone they profess the liberty of trading. This spot long baffled the inquiring curiosity of foreigners; but it is now discovered to be a small island laid down in Admiral Cecile's chart intermediate between Loochoo and Japan."<sup>23</sup> Western explorers had finally discovered what locals already knew: Tokara/Tucharu was a ruse designed to conceal Japanese control over Ryukyu.

## TOKUGAWA JAPAN AND MING/QING CHINA

Tokugawa relations with China involved a different type of invention: indirect ties through a third party, the Nagasaki Chinese translators. Until 1684, trade between China and Japan was technically a violation of Ming maritime prohibitions. Chinese junks continued to visit Nagasaki, but according to Ming law this was smuggling. When the Qing abolished Ming restrictions, trade surged and over 190 junks reached Nagasaki in 1688. Japanese officials were alarmed by the outflow of silver and copper and sought to restrict and regulate Chinese junks, but this raised difficult diplomatic questions. What authority did the Japanese have over Chinese traders? What authority did the Qing have over Chinese expatriates in Nagasaki? The Tokugawa dodged these issues by having a nonstate third party regulate the China trade. Beginning in 1715, the Nagasaki Chinese translator bureau began to issue trading certificates (*shinpai*) to ethnic Chinese ship captains. Although the bureau was under Tokugawa control, the certificates omitted any reference to either the Tokugawa or the Qing. This tactic effectively dodged the question of Tokugawa-Qing relations. When Chinese merchants appealed to the Qing court, the Kangxi emperor himself confirmed that the *shinpai* were a private matter between individual merchants and interpreters in Nagasaki.<sup>24</sup>

Thus, unlike relations between Japan and Korea, or between Japan and Ryukyu, Tokugawa-Qing relations were officially unofficial. But decisions about trade in Nagasaki were debated at the highest levels in Beijing and Edo. Beijing elected not to challenge Nagasaki's *shinpai* policy, but it manipulated the system to serve Chinese interests. Initially, the Qing ordered Chinese merchants to cooperate in their use of the limited supply of permits. In the 1730s, however, the court became concerned with a drop in copper imports, took control of some *shinpai*, and gave them to the chief of the Copper Procurement Office (Tong Diaoda Guan). The purportedly private trading permits were thereafter held by the Chinese state.<sup>25</sup> Iwai Shigeki has described this process as "silent diplomacy" (*chinmoku gaikō*); Beijing and Edo managed their indirect relationship without diplomatic ties.<sup>26</sup>

The *shinpai* system was also used to maintain ties with Southeast Asian nations, including Siam, Cambodia, and Patani. These states would hire Chinese captains for semiofficial trading missions to Nagasaki; the captain's authorization to trade was private, but government officials were accorded special recognition. This created something of a gray area of diplomatic and trade relations. Describing relations with Cambodia, for example, the shogunal advisor Arai Hakuseki (1657–1725) wrote that diplomatic relations had ended in 1627 but that Khmer officials continued to "pay their

respects" at Nagasaki.<sup>27</sup> Relations with the Khmer Kingdom thus involved more than trade but less than full diplomatic relations.

At the core of Tokugawa diplomacy was a negative engagement with the Chinese tribute system. Rather than describe what Japan would do, the tribute system defined what the Tokugawa would not do and would not say. Formal relations with the Ming and the Qing required the recognition of an explicit interstate hierarchy, and the shogunate found that unacceptable. More broadly, the entire language of diplomacy, with Chinese emperors and regional kings, reproduced that hierarchy. Tokugawa diplomats thus needed to avoid conventional diplomatic forms and terms. Working around those constraints, the sovereigns of Northeast Asia produced a distinctive interstate system, based largely on evading transparent hierarchies. Those evasions produced everything from the neologism "tycoon" to imaginary islands. What made these contrivances successful was multiparty support. The Ming/Qing in Beijing, Shō in Naha, Yi in Seoul, and Tokugawa in Edo all thought that diplomatic chicanery was preferable to war. While it is dangerous for historians to wax nostalgic, viewed from the early twenty-first century the diplomats of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Northeast Asia seem preternaturally wise. Rather than saber rattle over uninhabited rocks (Diaoyu, Dokdo, Paracel, and Spratlys), early modern officials smoothed tensions through ambiguous words and rituals meant to assuage their counterparts' sensitivities rather than aggravate them. The result was over two centuries of peace in Northeast Asia.

## NOTES

1. See Arano Yasunori, "Sakoku" o minaosu (Kawasaki, Japan: Kawasaki shōgai gakushū shinkō jigyōdan, 2003); and Yasunori Arano, "The Formation of a Japanocentric World Order," *The International Journal of Asian Studies* 2, no. 2 (2005): 185–216.

2. There is a sizable body of scholarship arguing that the usage of the term *taikun* represents a break with the Sinocentric international order and a move toward a "Japan-as-central-kingdom" view or a distinctly Japanese worldview (*Nihongata ka-i chitsujo* or *Nihongata ka-i shisō*). See, for example, Ronald P. Toby, *State and Diplomacy in Early Modern Japan* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984); Ronald P. Toby, "Contesting the Centre: International Sources of Japanese National Identity," *The International History Review* 7, no. 3 (1985): 347–363; and Arano Yasunori, *Kinsei Nihon to Higashi Ajia* (Tokyo: Tōkyō daigaku shuppankai, 1988). While I do not reject this view, I am more interested in how terms such as *taikun* represented the shared diplomatic interests of both parties and allowed for the maintenance of peaceful relations. For such a reconsideration, see James Bryant Lewis, *Frontier Contact between Chosōn Korea and Tokugawa Japan* (London: Routledge Curzon, 2003), 9–10. For a useful historiographic survey, see Ikeuchi Satoshi, *Taikun gaikō to "bui": kinsei Nihon no kokusai chitsujo to Chōsen-kan* (Nagoya, Japan: Nagoya daigaku shuppankai, 2006).

3. Etsuko Hae-jin Kang, *Diplomacy and Ideology in Japanese-Korean Relations: From the Fifteenth to the Eighteenth Century* (London: Macmillan Press, 1997), 141, 176. For a parallel account in Japanese, see Hayashi Fukusai and Hayakawa Junzaburō, ed., *Tsūko ichiran*, vol. 1 (Tokyo: Kokusho kankōkai, 1912–1913), 326. Vol. 327 in original edition.

4. The first three missions were charged with the negotiation and repatriation of prisoners of war. See Arano, "Sakoku" o minaosu, 52.

5. Toby, *Early Modern Japan*, 97–103, 203–205; Ronald P. Toby, "Carnival of the Aliens: Korean Embassies in Edo-Period Art and Popular Culture," *Monumenta Nipponica* 41, no. 4 (1986): 415–456; Robert I. Hellyer, *Defining Engagement: Japan and Global Contexts, 1640–1868* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009), 43–44. For a useful table of embassies, see Tsuruta Kei, *Tsushima kara mita Nitichō kankei* (Tokyo: Yamakawa shuppansha, 2006), 69; and Toby, *Early Modern Japan*, 36–37.

6. Lewis, *Frontier Contact*, 23–27.

7. Hoon Lee, "The Repatriation of Castaways in Chosōn Korea-Japan Relations, 1599–1888," *Korean Studies* 30, no. 1 (2006): 80–81.

8. Lewis, *Frontier Contact*, 24–26; Kang, *Diplomacy and Ideology*, 138–146, 154–166; and Toby, *Early Modern Japan*, 76–83.

9. Japan used the title "king" for diplomatic correspondence only in 1711, based on the reforms of Arai Hakuseki. For that debate see Kang, *Diplomacy and Ideology*, 197–222; Kate Wildman Nakai, *Shogunal Politics: Arai Hakuseki and the Premises of Tokugawa Rule*, vol. 134 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988), 190–202; and Ōishi Manabu, *Edo no gaikō senryaku* (Tokyo: Kadokawa gakugei shuppan, 2009), 109–112.

10. Bruce Cumings, *Korea's Place in the Sun: A Modern History*, 1st ed. (New York: Norton, 1997), 78; JaHyun Kim Haboush, *A Heritage of Kings: One Man's Monarchy in the Confucian World* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), 23–26, 39–47.

11. For Ming investiture and the founding of the Chosōn Yi dynasty, see Kang, *Diplomacy and Ideology*, 53–54; Philip de Heer, "Three Embassies to Seoul: Sino-Korean Relations in the 15th Century," in *Conflict and Accommodation in Early Modern East Asia: Essays in Honour of Erik Zürcher*, ed. Leonard Blussé and Harriet T. Zurndorfer (Leiden, Netherlands: Brill, 1993), 240–258; and Donald N. Clark, "Sino-Korean Tributary Relations under the Ming," in *The Cambridge History of China* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) 8:272–300.

12. Kang, *Diplomacy and Ideology*, 167–168, 173–194.

13. Gregory Smits, *Visions of Ryukyu: Identity and Ideology in Early-Modern Thought and Politics* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1999), 15–16; Hellyer, *Defining Engagement*, 34–36.

14. For a chart of mission, see Arano, "Sakoku" o minaosu, 75; Toby, *Early Modern Japan*, 48–49.

15. Hellyer, *Defining Engagement*, 45. Later Tokugawa protocols specified Ming-style clothing.

16. *Ibid.*, 38–39. For a good summary of attempts to conceal Japanese influence see Smits, *Visions of Ryukyu*, esp. 44–46. Because Satsuma actively sought to hide Japanese customs from Chinese envoys, the 1609 Japanese political domination of Ryukyu coincided with an increase in Chinese cultural influence. This coincidence of Chinese cultural domination and Japanese political domination was noted even by a member of Perry's 1853–1854 mission who observed that Ryukyu was "de facto and de jure a part of Japan" despite "the similarity, if not the identity, of their religion, literature, and many of their manners and customs" with China (Francis L. Hawks, ed., *Narrative of the Expedition of an American*

*Squadron to the China Seas and Japan, Performed in the Years 1852, 1853, and 1854, under the Command of Commodore M. C. Perry, United States Navy, by Order of the Government of the United States*, vol. serial set, vol. 769, session vol. 14, 33rd Congress, 2nd Sess., S. Exec. Doc. 79 pt. 1 [Washington, DC: Berkeley Tucker, Senate Printer, 1856], 222.) See also Smits, *Visions of Ryukyu*, 43–44, 71–132.

17. Kamiya Nobuyuki, *Ryūkyū to Nihon, Chūgoku* (Tokyo: Yamakawa shuppansha, 2003), 78–80; and Smits, *Visions of Ryukyu*, 46. See also Higashionna Kanjun, *Higashionna Kanjun zenshu*, vol. 1 (Tokyo: Daiichi Shobo, 1978), 70–71.

18. For a detailed English-language study on the strange triangular relationship among Ryukyu, Japan, and China, see Angela Schottenhammer, “Empire and Periphery? The Qing Empire’s Relations with Japan and the Ryūkyūs (1644–c. 1800), a Comparison,” *Medieval History Journal* 15, no. 2 (2012): 139–196.

19. Uehara Kenzen “Chūgoku ni taisuru Ryūnichī kankei no inpei seisaki to ‘michi no shima,’” in *Rettsōshi no minami to kita*, ed. Isao Kikuchi and Fusaaki Maehira (Tokyo: Yoshikawa kōbunkan, 2006), 35–41.

20. Kamiya traces the appearance of Takarashima/Tokara in official histories to Sai On’s (1682–1761) 1725 edition of *Chūzan seifu* while Smits gives a discussion of the later official history *Kyūyō*. See Kamiya, *Ryūkyū to Nihon*, 84–85; Smits, *Visions of Ryukyu*, 44–45. For a good overview of the imaginary country issue, see Uehara, “Chūgoku ni taisuru Ryūnichī kankei no inpei seisaki to ‘michi no shima.’”

21. Frederick William Beechey, *Narrative of a Voyage to the Pacific and Beering’s Strait to Co-operate with the Polar Expeditions: Performed in His Majesty’s Ship Blossom under the Command of Captain F. W. Beechey . . . in the Years 1825, 26, 27, 28*, 2 vols., no. 2 (London: H. Colburn and R. Bentley, 1831), 210–211.

22. George Smith, *Lewchew and the Lewchewans; Being a Narrative of a Visit to Lewchew, or Loo Choo, in October, 1850* (London: T. Hatchard, 1853), 34–36.

23. George Smith, *Ten Weeks in Japan* (London: Longman, Green, Longman and Roberts, 1861), 345–346.

24. For a survey of Japanese scholarship, see Peng Hao, “Nagasaki bōeki ni okeru shinpai seido to Shinchō no taiō,” no. 119 (2010). In English, see Norihito Mizuno, “China in Tokugawa Foreign Relations: The Tokugawa Bakufu’s Perception of and Attitudes toward Ming-Qing China,” *Sino-Japanese Studies* 15 (2003): 140–144; Anthony Reid, “The Unthreatening Alternative: Chinese Shipping to Southeast Asia, 1567–1842,” *Review of Indonesian and Malaysian Affairs* 27 (1993): 13–32; and Angela Schottenhammer, “Japan—The ‘Tiny Dwarf’? Sino-Japanese Relations from the Kangxi to the Qianlong Reigns” in *The East Asian Mediterranean: Maritime Crossroads of Culture, Commerce and Human Migration*, ed. Angela Schottenhammer (Wiesbaden, Germany: Harrassowitz, 2008), 331–388. For diplomatic approaches to the Ming, see Miki Watanabe, “An International Maritime Trader—Torihara Sōan: The Agent for Tokugawa Ieyasu’s First Negotiations with Ming China, 1600,” in *The East Asian Mediterranean*, ed. Angela Schottenhammer (Wiesbaden, Germany: Harrassowitz, 2008), 169–176. For translated primary sources on the *shinpai* system and trade with Southeast Asia, see Yoneo Ishii, *The Junk Trade from Southeast Asia: Translations from the Tōsen Fusetsu-gaki, 1674–1723* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1998).

25. Peng, “Nagasaki bōeki ni okeru shinpai seido to Shinchō no taiō.”

26. Iwai summarized this approach in a recent public seminar. See Yomiuri Shinbun, “Jūhasseiki nitchū kan no bōekiken funsō to ‘chinmoku gaikō’: Jinbun kagaku kenkyūchō Iwai Shigeki shochō,” June 6, 2013, [http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/osaka/feature/kansai1286328830436\\_02/news/20130606-OYT8T00920.htm](http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/osaka/feature/kansai1286328830436_02/news/20130606-OYT8T00920.htm). In English, see Joshua

Fogel’s translation in Shigeki Iwai, “International Society after ‘The Transformation from Civilized to Barbarian,’” *Sino-Japanese Studies* 19 (2012): 7–18. In Japanese, see Iwai Shigeki, “Shindai no goshi to ‘chinmoku gaikō,’” in *Chūgoku Higashi Ajia gaikō kōryū-shi no kenkyū*, ed. Fuma Susumu (Kyoto, Japan: Kyōto daigaku Jinbun kagaku kenkyūjo, 2007), 354–390.

27. Arai Hakuseki, “Gaikoku tsūshin jiryaku,” in *Gojiryaku*, ed. Takeuchi Kunika (Tokyo: Hakusekisha, 1883), 36–58.