Konoe Memorial

February 14, 1945

Your subject respectfully submits this memorial for your Imperial Majesty's consideration. He now believes that regretful as it may be, defeat in the war will become inevitable, and upon this premise he wishes to set forth his views: It is true that defeat will be a blemish on our national polity. However, defeat alone will not endanger our national polity because public opinion in England and the United States has not insisted on a change in our national polity. (Of course, there are some extremist views and the future is by no means certain.) From the point of view of preserving our national polity, what concerns your subject most is not the defeat itself, but the possibility of a communist revolution accompanied by the defeat.

Both domestic and international situations are seemingly moving rapidly toward a communist revolution. In the international scene, there has been an outstanding advance in the position of the Soviet Union. Our people have never been able to grasp the true intent of the Soviet Union. Since the adoption in 1935 of the policy of a United Front—that is, the two­stage revolution tactic—and the subsequent dissolution of the Comintern, many of our people have taken lightly the danger of bolshevization. This is a superficial and unrealistic view. The Soviet Union has never abandoned its policy of bolshevization of the world, and this is made abundantly clear by its recent overt maneuvering in European countries.

The Soviet Union is attempting to establish Soviet regimes in European countries bordering it and pro­Soviet regimes in other European countries. Their work has been steady and it has been mostly successful. The Tito regime in Yugoslavia is a prime example. As to Poland, the Soviet Union first formed a government among the Polish refugees in the Soviet Union and then insisted that it could not deal with the Government in Exile in London. . . . While professing that it does not interfere in the domestic politics of other countries, in reality the Soviet Union has always interfered in the domestic politics of European countries, with a view to leading these countries to become pro­Soviet. The Soviet intent is equally applicable to East Asia. In Yenan, Okano [alias used by Nosaka Sanzo, leader of the Japan Communist Party] from Moscow to lead the Japan Liberation League, and made contact with the Korean Independence Alliance, Korean Volunteers' Corps, and Formosan Vanguard Corps. They are now appealing their causes to Japan proper.

Thus there is every reason to believe in the danger of an eventual interference by the Soviet Union in Japan's domestic politics (e.g., legal recognition of the Communist party, Cabinet portfolios for Communist party members, . . . abolition of the Peace Preservation Law and of the Anti­Comintern Pact). Now looking at the domestic scene, your subject finds that conditions are ripe for the success of a communist revolution. They are poverty, greater voice exercised by labor, proportionate increase in the pro­Soviet sentiment accompanied by the rise of enmity against Great Britain and the United States, reformist movements among military officers, bureaucratic officials joining such movements, and the underground activities of the leftists who are behind those movements. Of these, what worries your subject most are the reformist movements of some segments of the military. A great majority of our younger officers seem to think that our national polity and communism are compatible, and their avid advocation of internal reform within the military stems from this belief. Most of our professional soldiers come from families of middle or lower classes, and many of them are thoroughly imbued with the ideal of our national polity through their military education. Therefore communist agitators attempt to appeal to them by suggesting the compatibility of our national polity and communism. It is now clear that the Manchurian Incident, followed by the outbreak of the China Incident, and their subsequent extension into the Greater East Asia War were a chain of events carefully planned by the military. During the Manchurian Incident, they publicly stated that the incident was aimed at internal reform in Japan. This is a well­known fact. During the time of the China Incident also, the same conspirators in this group publicly averred that "it is better to prolong the incident. If it is solved then there will be no internal reform." This clique in the military that advocates internal reform may not be aiming at a communist revolution. However, those bureaucrats and civilians surrounding them—call them rightists or leftists, for the rightists are those communists under the garb of our national polity consciously attempt to bring about a communist revolution. It is fairly accurate to say that they are the ones who manipulate those unsophisticated, simple­minded soldiers.

The above is the conclusion your subject recently reached after calm reflections incorporating his extensive experiences dealing with the military, bureaucracy, rightists, leftists, and others during the past ten years. When your subject looks back to the happenings of the past ten years from this vantage point, there were many events that would support this conclusion. Your subject received the mandate to form a Cabinet twice. During his terms of office, he adopted some of those reformist doctrines in order to avoid internal friction. His eagerness to maintain national unity led him to overlook the true intent hidden behind their doctrines. All of these came from your subject's ignorance of the matter. He deeply regrets this and begs the forgiveness of Your Majesty. Recently, as the fortunes of war turned for the worse, increasingly voices are raised exhorting that the 100 million suffer death rather than dishonor. Those who advocate such a cause are not the so­called rightists, but rather the communists who instigate from behind, hoping that through the resulting confusion, their aim of effecting a revolution may be realized.

While on the one hand they advocate complete destruction of the United States and Great Britain, on the other hand they are fostering pro­Soviet sentiment. One segment of the military even avers that Japan should align with the Soviet Union regardless of the sacrifice involved. Another school thinks of collaboration with the Chinese communist forces in Yanan. This being the case, conditions for the success of a communist revolution are becoming better each day both internally and externally. Should the tide of war worsen even further, this situation might develop rapidly. If there should be a ray of hope in the war, it would be different. However, viewing from the premise that defeat is inevitable, we are fighting a hopeless war. Should we continue it any further, we would be playing into the hands of the communints. From the point of view of upholding our national polity, we must conclude the war as soon as possible. The greatest obstacle to the termination of war is the existence of the clique in the military who brought about the current crisis from the time of the Manchurian Incident. They have lost confidence in pursuing the war to a successful end, but insist on resisting the enemies in order to save face.

In attempting to bring about an early end to the war, unless we make a clean sweep of this group, there may be great confusion caused by the collaboration of rightist and leftist civilian co­conspirators with this group to attain their goals. To end the war we must first make a clean sweep of this group. Once we make a clean sweep of this group within the military, those opportunistic bureaucrats and rightist and leftist co­conspirators are likely to cease functioning. This is so because they do not have power of their own and must manipulate the military to effect their sinister designs. As it is said, destroy the roots and the leaves will wilt of their own. Perhaps this is folly on your subject's part, but he wishes to speculate that once a clean sweep of this group is made and the military's complexion is changed, the attitudes of the United States, Great Britain, and Chongqing (KMT/GMD) might become more lenient toward us. Originally the United States, Great Britain and Chongqing proclaimed that their war aims were to destroy Japanese military cliques. If the character of the military should change and its policy were altered, would they [the Allied powers] not reconsider the desirability of continuing the war? Setting this aside the prerequisites to saving Japan from a communist revolution lie in th clean sweep of this group and rebuilding of the military. Your subject humbly begs of Your Majesty to take an unprecedented resolute step in this matter.